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WHO needs US$ 87.4 million over 6 months, from September 2024 to February 2025, to work with countries, partners and other stakeholders to stop and contain the current outbreak of mpox.
Issue Brief 39
Fact Sheet
There has been a global outbreak of mpox since 2022; this outbreak has been caused by the strain of mpox virus called Clade 2 and has affected around 116 countries worldwide. The current surge in cases is being driven by the rapid spread of a different strain – Clade 1b – which is predominantly
...
Mpox is a zoonotic disease caused by a double-stranded DNA virus that belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus of the Poxviridae family. The disease presents with symptoms similar to smallpox but with a lesser severity. It was first discovered in 1958 when two outbreaks of a poxlike disease occurred in co
...
i. A person who is a contact of a probable or confirmed mpox case in the 21 days before the onset of signs or symptoms, and who presents with any of the following: acute onset of fever (>38.5°C), headache, myalgia (muscle pain/body aches), back pain, profound weakness or fatigue.
OR
ii. A per
...
Flyer German
On August 13, 2024, the Africa CDC declared the mpox outbreak a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security (PHECS). The following day, the WHO declared it a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). A coordinated, continent-wide response is essential, co-led by the African Union
...
On 14 August 2024, the Director-General of the World Health Organization determined that the upsurge of mpox in a growing number of countries in Africa constitutes a new public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005)
Situation Update
Mpox can spread in humans through close contact, usually skin-to-skin contact, including sexual contact, with an infected person or animal, as well as with materials contaminated with the virus such as clothing, beddings and towels, and respiratory droplets in prolonged face to face contact. People
...
The safety of children is a top concern for parents and school authorities in the current mpox outbreak, as those
under 15 face elevated risks, particularly in the hardesthit Northwestern and Eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
interim guidance, 25 November 2024
This document serves to provide interim guidance/ recommendations to carry out mpox surveillance activities mainly case investigation, contact tracing and isolation. For the development of this document WHO, UKHSA and CDC guidelines were referred to and adopted within the country context.
This toolkit is a comprehensive set of practical tools and resources designed to support country-level risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) practitioners, decision-makers, and partners to plan and implement readiness and response activities for yellow fever outbreaks. The toolkit conta
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In conclusion, the current evidence does not support the use of mpox antigen RDTs in the field. More data are expected from independent evaluations conducted by Africa CDC, FIND or other organizations
Diagnostic de mpox.
On 13 August 2024, the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC) declared the multi-country mpox outbreak a public health emergency of continental security, with strong recommendations to improve surveillance and vaccine deployment in all AU Member States. On 14 August 2024, the WHO Director-G
...
Surveillance Mpox. Protocole de notification pour les états membres de l'union Africaine
recommended
On 13 August 2024, the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC) declared the multi-country mpox outbreak a public health emergency of continental security, with strong recommendations to improve surveillance and vaccine deployment in all AU Member States. On 14 August 2024, the WHO Director-G
...
It is impossible to address the many complex needs of respiratory virus surveillance with a single surveillance system. Multiple systems, investigations and studies must each be fit-for-purpose to specific priority surveillance objectives, and only together can they provide essential information to
...
