28 Sept. 2021 The focus of this fact sheet is on the four main causes of acute bacterial meningitis: Neisseria meningitidis (meningococcus) Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus) Haemophilus influenzae Streptococcus agalactiae (group B streptococcus

Available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. You can download a summary of the main report and background documents! The report demonstrates that the current system—at both national and international levels— was not adequate to protect people from COVID-19. The time it took from the reporting of a cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown origin in mid-late December 2019 to a Public Health Emergency of International Concern being declared was too long. February 2020 was also a lost month when many more countries could have taken steps to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and forestall the global health, social, and economic catastrophe that continues its grip. The Panel finds that the system as it stands now is clearly unfit to prevent another novel and highly infectious pathogen, which could emerge at any time, from developing into a pandemic

Biosafety involves the implementation of containment principles, technologies and practices to prevent unintentional exposure to biological agents. Biosecurity involves the protection, control and accountability of biological materials and information related to these materials and dualuse research, to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release

A public health emergency operation center (PHEOC) serves as a hub for better coordinating the preparation, response, and recovery for public health emergencies. A functional PHEOC is critical for the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005). The Framework for a Public Health Emergency Operations Centre provides high-level guidance for establishing or strengthening a PHEOC. To establish and/or strengthen a PHEOC, it is vital for Member States to align with standardized policies, guidelines, and tools

A Public Health EOC (PHEOC) serves as a hub for coordinating the preparation for, response to, and recovery from public health emergencies. The preparation includes planning, such as risk and resource mapping, development of plans and procedures, and training and exercising. The response includes all activities related to investigation, response and recovery. The PHEOC also serves as a hub for coordinating resources and information to support response actions during a public health emergency and enhances communication and collaboration among relevant stakeholders

La méningite est mortelle et débilitante ; elle frappe brutalement ; elle a de graves conséquences sanitaires, économiques et sociales et touche tous les âges de la vie dans tous les pays du monde. La méningite bactérienne peut être à l’origine d’épidémies, entraîner la mort dans les 24 heures et un patient sur cinq peut rester handicapé à vie à la suite d’une infection. La plupart des cas et des décès dus à la méningite pourraient être évités par la vaccination mais les progrès obtenus pour la vaincre sont bien moins rapides que ceux réalisés contre d’autres maladies à prévention vaccinale

orientaciones provisionales, 8 de noviembre de 2020 This interim guidance is most useful for countries interested in monitoring relative circulations of influenza and SARS-CoV-2 viruses. The document provides practical information to maintain surveillance of influenza and monitor SARS-CoV-2 using existing surveillance systems. It contains updated considerations for addressing disruptions in the influenza sentinel surveillance and extending to include COVID-19 wherever possible. Updated algorithms for testing of both influenza and SARS-CoV-2 for surveillance are also included. This document is an update of Operational considerations for COVID-19 surveillance using GISRS and GISRS for the upcoming influenza seasons during the COVID-19 pandemi

Representative, quality, timely and continuous genetic surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 is critical to the COVID-19 outbreak response. This document provides practical guidance to Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) laboratories and other relevant national laboratories to move beyond virus detection to genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 PCR positive materials obtained from sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI), acute respiratory infection (ARI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI). It contains considerations on sample selection for sequencing, numbers of viruses to be sequenced, metadata and timeliness for sharing genetic sequence data (GSD) and opportunities for technical support

Representative, quality, timely and continuous genetic surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 is critical to the COVID-19 outbreak response. This document provides practical guidance to Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) laboratories and other relevant national laboratories to move beyond virus detection to genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 PCR positive materials obtained from sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI), acute respiratory infection (ARI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI). It contains considerations on sample selection for sequencing, numbers of viruses to be sequenced, metadata and timeliness for sharing genetic sequence data (GSD) and opportunities for technical support