ALNAP
LEARNING • ACCOUNTABILITY • PERFORMANCE
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

AN INTRODUCTION TO EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION (EHA)

CHANNEL RESEARCH in association with ALNAP

COURSE MANUAL

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Introduction

Background

This manual was prepared for **a training session on the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action (EHA),** facilitated by **Ms Margie Buchanan-Smith,** and **Mr John Telford** and held in Belgium in 2007. It can be used or adapted for other courses.

The training is at introductory-to-intermediate level, with the following **aims**:

1. To make evaluations of humanitarian assistance **more effective** in contributing to improved performance.

2. To improve the **quality of evaluation processes**.

The learning objectives of the course are to achieve:

(i) Greater clarity of the **purpose and objectives of EHA**, and of the principal challenges of doing EHA.

(ii) Better understanding of **evaluation criteria and of the most relevant frameworks** against which humanitarian assistance should be evaluated.

(iii) A practical approach to **planning, designing, implementing and following through** on evaluations of humanitarian action.

This training is **aimed at evaluators, managers and users of evaluation**. It presents an opportunity for learning and exchange between participants from different backgrounds and who play different roles. This 3-day training programme has been developed drawing on a variety of sources, principally the three e ALNAP EHA training modules.

Suggested Programme

Time	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3
09.00	Introductions – to the workshop, participants/ trainers, administration, etc. Locating EHA	What to evaluate: selecting and applying EHA criteria and frameworks	EHA teams and managing evaluations
10.40	BREAK	BREAK	BREAK
11.00	Purpose of EHA	Above session continued	Producing EHA Reports
12.40	BREAK	BREAK	BREAK
14.00	Initiating and planning EHA	Evaluation methodologies	Use and dissemination of EHA

Time	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3
15.40	BREAK	BREAK	BREAK
16.00	Group work – participant case studies based on the above sessions	Group work – participant case studies based on the above sessions	Continued and Course evaluation and closure
17.40	Wrap-up and closure	Wrap-up and closure	Wrap-up and closure

This manual has been complied from a range of sources which are referenced throughout.

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Exercise: 'Locating' EHA

Without referring to the course manual, please write, on individual cards, a short:

- Definition of Evaluation
- Definition of Humanitarian Action
- List of types of Humanitarian Action (i.e. scenarios or contexts in which HA is provided, as opposed to specific activities or sectors)

You may work in pairs or threes. **You have 10 minutes**

What is evaluation of humanitarian action?

Humanitarian Action

"Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards." (Source: ALNAP evaluation training materials, module 1, 2003). HA includes disaster, preparedness, prevention and recovery activities[1].

Evaluation

"The process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or programme. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or completed development intervention. The aim is to determine the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partner and donor" (DAC, 2001a). **Monitoring and evaluation can be tools for Results-Based Management (RBM):** "A management strategy focussing on performance and achievement of outcomes and impacts" (DAC, 2001a).

Humanitarian Evaluation

"A systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and practice and enhance accountability." (ALNAP EHA Guide, 2005)



Figure, regular evaluation in the project cycle over time[2]

[1] **Note:** Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction activities do not necessarily 'result from … emergencies and natural hazards'. They may take place prior to their becoming real, as is clear from the HA objectives set by many actors, including Sphere, the RC movement, ECHO and donors, through the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, which states that: *The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations. (GHD 2003)*

[2] Adapted from Jan Davis and Robert Lambert, Engineering in Emergencies, First Edition, p. 63.

While other approaches to evaluation, learning and accountability exist, this course is primarily about the common approach to EHA: a team of evaluators (including ‘independent’ consultants) who undertake a mission to the ‘field’ and produce a report as an output.

Viewing Evaluation as a Project in Itself

Planning

- Purpose
- Users and their needs

Preparation/research

- Scoping Study
- Inception Report
- Logistics preparation

Fieldwork

- Scheduling
- Flexibility
- Communications
- Trouble-shooting
- Reaching a shared/team position
- Provisional findings/conclusions and potential recommendations

Report preparation

- Team involvement
- Analysis, logic and verification: of findings/conclusions and recommendations
- Draft report
- Comments
- Final report

Dissemination

- Audiences
- Formats

Follow-up

- Responsibilities for action
- Processes
- Later (e.g. 12 month) review of progress

Evaluation Stages and Responsibilities

Source: DFID evaluation guidelines <www.dfid.gov>

STAGE	TASKS	RESPONSIBILITY	OUTPUTS
Planning, commissioning	Drafting, circulation and approval of concept note Selection and briefing of Steering Group Drafting, circulation and approval of TOR Consultant selection	Evaluation Manager Evaluation Manager (+ Steering Group)	Concept paper TOR Tender documents
Inception	Briefing consultants Initial research Drafting Inception report Circulation and approval of Inception Report	Evaluation Manager Consultants Consultants Evaluation Manager and Steering Group	Inception report
Preparation and research	Project/programme research Interviews (UK and email) Planning country visits and dissemination strategy	Consultants Consultants Consultants, Evaluation Manager and Steering Group	
Country visits	Preparatory visit: Planning activities Draft and circulate visit report Main visit: Evaluation research Workshop(s) Draft and circulate visit report	Consultants (implementation) Evaluation Manager (Quality of process)	Visit reports In-country workshops
Reporting	Draft report and Evaluation summary Circulate report for comment Edit and revise report Circulation and comment on revised report Submission to Development Committee Final amendments to report	Consultants Evaluation Manager and Steering Group Consultants & editor Evaluation Manager and Steering Group Evaluation Manager Evaluation Manager and Consultants	Draft Report Revised Report Final Report
Dissemination	Publication and distribution of report and Evaluation summary Workshops	Evaluation Manager Consultants, Steering Group and Evaluation Manager	Published Report EVALUATION SUMMARY Workshops

Fundamental Premises of the Utilization-Focus

Fourteen premises as indicated by Patton, M. (1997) *Utilization-Focussed Evaluation: The New Century Text* Edition 3 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Commitment to intended use by intended users should be the driving force in an evaluation
- Strategizing about use is ongoing and continuous from the very beginning of an evaluation
- The personal factor contributes significantly to use
- Careful and thoughtful stakeholder analysis should inform identification of primary intended users
- Evaluations must be focussed in some way; focusing on intended use by intended users is the most useful way
- Focusing on intended use requires making deliberate and thoughtful choices
- Useful evaluations must be designed and adapted situationally
- Intended users' commitment to use can be nurtured and enhanced by actively involving them in making significant decisions about the evaluation
- High quality participation is the goal, not high quantity participation
- High quality involvement of intended users will result in high quality, useful evaluations
- Evaluators have a rightful stake in that their credibility and integrity are always at risk, thus the mandate to be active-reactive-adaptive
- Evaluators committed to enhancing use have a responsibility to train users
- Use is different from reporting and dissemination
- Serious attention to use involves financial and time costs that are far from trivial

Locating Evaluation: 'Lesson Learning' and/or 'Accountability'?

Extract from DFID Evaluation Guidelines <www.dfid.gov>

Ideally, all evaluations will aim to contribute to both of these objectives. However, evaluation managers should be clear on the balance that they wish to strike between these two objectives and the consequential impact on their function.

Practically, if accountability is the primary objective, managers should seek to manage the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation process is transparently managed and that the evaluators are clearly impartial and free to state their conclusions. In such evaluations, a key task of the evaluation manager is to ensure that all stakeholders have an opportunity to comment on the evaluators' conclusions and that such comments are given due weight. The approach to accomplishing this varies between organisations. In some organisations, other stakeholders are given the opportunity to include a written response in any evaluation report produced. Within DFID, this is not the normal practice. Instead, evaluators and managers normally seek to resolve differences before the final report is published, or submitted to the Development Committee.

If lesson learning is the major objective, evaluation managers need to focus on ensuring that the evaluation is managed to ensure that those involved in implementation have the maximum opportunity to learn the lessons emerging. In practice, this means that the manager will need to ensure greater ownership of the evaluation by implementers before the evaluation starts, their greater involvement during implementation and a greater planned investment in dissemination

The Monitoring, Evaluation, Audit 'scale'

What distinguishes monitoring, evaluation and auditor? There are no hard and fast, mutually exclusive definitions for these terms. They are increasingly dynamic. They are applied in different ways by different organisations and in different times. Increasingly, they overlap, share and adapt similar aims, methodologies and approaches.

Auditors, for example, increasingly include conclusions and recommendations in their reports that are in some cases similar in scope to those commonly addressed in evaluations. Auditors increasingly go beyond auditing compliance and enquiring into the substantive use of resources (examining 'results' and 'outcomes').

Yet, identical they are not. Useful de-limiting lines can be identified. A very rough, relative scale, as follows, might be helpful.

Approach	**Activity**
Facilitated/internal	Monitoring
Routine/lessons learned	
Systematic/including accountability	Evaluation
Control/Compliance	
Investigation/External	Audit/Inspection

The main issue is not what distinguishes the methods or approaches. Overlaps will occur, as in most project-cycle management activities (e.g. assessment and monitoring). **The important challenge is how to best manage and apply evaluation, in order to improve learning and accountability.**

Accountability and Evaluations

PROGRAMME EVALUATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: ARE THEY A TOOL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY? *SECOND DRAFT* 15/01/2002 *This is an extract from a paper by Koenraad Van Brabant*

Abstract[3]

This discussion paper does not question evaluations per se, but the stated claims that they are an important tool for the accountability of humanitarian actors. It starts from an understanding of 'accountability', that is closer to the audit function than the learning function, and provides for possible consequences, both positive or negative, as praise or reprimand. It argues that if accountability is the purpose, then evaluations should inquire more into responsibilities, obligations and good practice benchmarks, bring out the views of disaster affected people much more strongly, and should be more 'public' than they currently tend to be. The paper then looks more specifically at the argument that 'learning' is a valid outcome from a critical evaluation and suggest that the argument, although acceptable, also can and is being abused to avoid responsibility. It concludes that the current practice is one of 'light accountability' at best. If evaluations are genuinely meant to provide a basis for accountability, they would have to inquire with much more depth and should more strongly lead to consequences, than is currently the case.

Accountability?

The focus of this discussion paper is on the claim that evaluations of humanitarian action, *by themselves*, constitute a form of accountability. In order to examine that claim, we need to reflect on the quality of evaluations, on their public availability, and on the consequences of evaluations, but first on how we understand 'accountability'. Key components of any serious accountability framework are the following:

- *Duty-bearers*: it has to be clear who is accountable;
- *Affected people*: someone has to be affected by the actions or inactions of a duty-bearer; we will call the range of those that are most closely and directly affected, the 'primary stakeholders';
- *Obligations or responsibilities*: the nature and scope of obligations or responsibilities of a duty-bearer have to be determined. Sometimes obligations will be spelled out in legal or administrative documents, sometimes an actor or agency has taken on responsibilities out of its own choice, perhaps inspired by a self-ascribed mandate or mission;
- *Benchmarks*: performance has to be reviewed against something, typically normative standards, or benchmarks or guidelines that are more open to interpretation. Constraints over which the agency whose performance is under review has no control, are to be taken into account;
- *Mechanisms of holding accountable*: comments and perspectives on performance can be channelled or elicited in various ways. The mechanism under consideration here is that of 'evaluation', be it commissioned by the agency itself, or a key stakeholder, typically a donor administration;

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[3] I am grateful to John Borton, Wayne MacDonald and Peter Giesen for comments on an earlier draft. Obviously the final version remains the author's responsibility only.

- *Duty-holders*: An actor or agency with a formal or self-ascribed mandate, to monitor whether duty-bearers are indeed fulfilling their responsibilities in a proper way. It is very well possible for duty-holders themselves to be duty-bearers: NGOs for example, often see themselves as duty-holders of governments. But they themselves have taken up responsibilities, for which they become accountable.

- *Outcomes*: An accountability framework without outcomes, be it in the form of praise or reprimand, and sometimes redress to a wronged party, cannot be seen as genuine or serious. In the end, whether one performs well or poorly, needs to make a difference.

Evaluations as a Tool for Accountability.

The current tendency is to 'lean' evaluations towards the 'learning' end of a spectrum. This can be valid, but should also be recognised as 'accountability light'. [4] If we take a more rigorous understanding of 'accountability', leaning towards the 'audit' end of a spectrum, then to serve as a basis for accountability, programme evaluations of humanitarian action would have to:

- Be much clearer about the nature of the agent's responsibilities, whether mandated or self-assumed, about standards and benchmarks, and about what was under the agent's control and what not;

- Focus not only on activities and outputs but also impacts;

- Of necessity draw in the viewpoints of other key stakeholders, especially the intended 'beneficiaries', and give these viewpoints adequate weight;

- Be disseminated more widely, and be more accessible, including in the disaster-affected areas;

- Lead to some form of reward or reprimand.

In conclusion then, it appears that we need to review our current infatuation with evaluations *as such* and

- Find a better balance between critical monitoring and participatory reviews to serve as management tools, and retrospective 'evaluations' [5];

- Concentrate efforts on rendering more explicit and systematic the wide range of benchmarks and indicators that we now use implicitly and informally, and perhaps rather ad hoc and piecemeal? [6]

- More closely integrate the monitoring, evaluation and audit functions into policy, operations and staff development;

- Invest more in individual and organisational learning processes, and format insights from reviews, evaluations and impact assessments in such a way that they can be incorporated

[4] This paraphrases the earlier identification of operational coordination among aid agencies as 'coordination light', i.e. kept to the absolute minimum in order to maintain consensus (Borton).

[5] This is a point that John Borton has been making for years.

[6] Which goes well beyond key 'technical sectors' such as covered by the Sphere handbook.

into learning exercises. This will require a stronger articulation of 'frameworks of good thinking'. [7]

- Where evaluations are intended to be a basis for robust accountability, formulate questions more in line with a proper understanding of 'accountability', put them in a wider 'public domain', including in the disaster-affected countries and make them result in praise or reprimand where it is due.

[7] A recurrent argument against the articulation of 'good' or 'best practice' is that all situations are unique and that there can be no prescriptive practice that will be most appropriate for all contexts. This is correct as a general assertion. In reality 'good practice' probably consists of a mix of normative do's and don't and situational judgements. I would hold that it is possible to provide some articulation of that, in the form of a framework for 'good thinking', to help the aid worker analyse a situation and come to well considered choices and decisions (for an example see Van Brabant 2000.)

Exploring EHA: Synopses of media articles

Synopsis I: World Bank report on evaluations use and abuse. *Agence France-Presse: Experts assail 'proselytizing' World Bank research Fri Dec 22, 3:50 PM*

WASHINGTON (AFP) - Much of the World Bank's voluminous research is of little worth, and relies on questionable evidence to advance its policy goals, according to a hard-hitting evaluation by outside experts. The study, overseen by four world-leading experts in international development, looked at nearly 4,000 papers, books and reports issued by the World Bank from 1998 to 2005 and found "some outstanding work."

"But the panel had substantial criticisms of the way that this research was used to proselytize on behalf of Bank policy, often without taking a balanced view of the evidence, and without expressing appropriate skepticism."Internal research that was favorable to Bank positions was given great prominence, and unfavorable research ignored," said the quartet's report. … A spokeswoman, Merrell Tuck, said the report was put online Tuesday "in the interests of transparency" a day after a meeting of the lender's development effectiveness committee. But the panel's chairman, Princeton University economics professor Angus Deaton, noted that he had delivered the report in September and told AFP: "It's taken so long to make this public that I forgot exactly what's in there."

Bank chief economist François Bourguignon, who commissioned the report, said it was a "deep and thoughtful" contribution while stressing its finding that nearly two-thirds of the lender's research ranks as above-average. "But we recognize the need to maintain effective checks and balances in order to achieve the objective of maintaining a high-quality Bank research program," he said in a written response.

… They (the authors) argued that the 2.5 percent of its total two-billion-dollar budget that the World Bank spends on research "is surely too low given the multiplicity of tasks that research is expected to fulfill." "One of the comparisons that we like to make is they spend less than half as much on research than they do on the executive board of the bank," Deaton said. "The place is supposed to be a knowledge bank." And the research all too often feeds into pre-existing policy goals rather than driving new thinking, said the report, which highlighted the World Bank's work on pensions reform, and its data collection, for criticism. "In these cases, we believe that there was a serious failure of the checks and balances that should separate advocacy and research," it argued.

The panel endorsed the Bank's right to defend its own policies, but it charged that the leadership "selectively appeals to relatively new and untested research as hard evidence that its preferred policies work." The analysis has been taken up for review by Bourguignon and World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz, who was himself accused of skewing intelligence to fit policy preconceptions when he was US deputy defense secretary. As Bank chief, however, Wolfowitz is overseeing a new drive for transparency, especially to root out corruption in the organization's lending. End

Synopsis II: ***Global Warming Trend? Not True for Antarctica,*** *by Guy Gugliotta Washington Post Service Tuesday, January 15, 2002* ***Climate Cooling Steadily, Scientists Find***

WASHINGTON The Earth may be in the midst of a planet-wide warming cycle, but in a startling departure from global trends, scientists have found that temperatures on the Antarctic continent have fallen steadily for more than two decades. Peter Doran, a researcher, said that scientists working in the McMurdo Dry Valleys of east Antarctica had found temperatures dropping at a rate of 1.2 degrees Fahrenheit (0.7 degrees centigrade) per decade since 1986 and had observed similar downward trends across the continent since 1978.

Mr. Doran stressed that although scientists could not explain the falling temperatures, the research "does not change the fact that the planet has warmed up on the whole. The findings simply point out that Antarctica is not responding as expected." The United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that there has been a net rise in global air temperature of 0.1 degree Fahrenheit per decade in the 20th century, a calculation that includes the Antarctic data.

Mr. Doran also warned that "you don't want to overstate the effects" of the cooling trend, because any rise in sea level caused by global warming this century is expected to come from thermal expansion of existing oceans and not from any theoretical melting of the southern ice cap.

"I'd be very careful with this," added Michael Oppenheimer, chief scientist for Environmental Defense, a nonprofit organization. "My general view has been that there's simply not enough data to make a broad statement about all of Antarctica."

So the researchers began looking at data collected since the project's inception, and found that temperatures had been dropping, not rising, since 1986, with the effect most pronounced in summer and autumn. Glacial ice was not melting, streams were not flowing, lakes were shrinking and microorganisms were disappearing. The researchers found that Antarctica as a whole had gotten considerably colder. After rising between 1966 and 1978, temperatures have fallen. End

Synopsis III: 'National interest' halts arms corruption inquiry *David Leigh & Rob Evans 15 Dec. 2006 Guardian*

A major criminal investigation into alleged corruption by the arms company BAE Systems and its executives was stopped in its tracks yesterday when the prime minister claimed it would endanger Britain's security if the inquiry was allowed to continue. The remarkable intervention was announced by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, who took the decision to end the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) inquiry into alleged bribes paid by the company to Saudi officials, after consulting cabinet colleagues.

In recent weeks, BAE and the Saudi embassy had frantically lobbied the government for the long-running investigation to be discontinued, with the company insisting it was poised to lose another lucrative Saudi contract if it was allowed to go on. This came at a time when the SFO appeared to have made a significant breakthrough, with investigators on the brink of accessing key Swiss bank accounts. However, Lord Goldsmith consulted the prime minister, the defence secretary, foreign secretary, and the intelligence services, and they decided that "the wider public interest" "outweighed the need to maintain the rule of law". Mr Blair said it would be bad for Britain's security if the SFO was allowed to go ahead, according to the statement made in the Lords by Lord Goldsmith. The statement did not elaborate on the nature of the threat.

BAE claimed that it was about to lose out on a third phase of the Al-Yamamah deal, in which the Saudis would buy 72 Typhoon aircraft in a deal worth £6bn. The Saudis had also hinted that they would do a deal with the French instead if the inquiry pushed ahead. A 10-day ultimatum was reportedly issued by the Saudis earlier this month. A PR campaign headed by Lord Bell saw MPs from all parties urging the dropping of the investigation, citing fears that jobs would be lost in their constituencies. But in its statements last night the government said commercial considerations had played no part in the decision.

The decision was condemned last night as naked political interference in a criminal case. Norman Lamb, the Liberal Democrat chief of staff, said the government had succumbed to Saudi pressure. "I think it's because the inquiry has been making substantial progress that it's been brought to an end," he said. … Lord Goldsmith's statement was unusual in that it did not refer to the claimed threats to British jobs, but instead concentrated on "national security".

… BAE, in a statement, said it welcomed the dropping of the inquiry. But the company and its executives may not yet be out of the woods. The attorney general has allowed investigations to continue into BAE activities in Romania, Chile, the Czech Republic, South Africa and Tanzania, which legal sources say are making strong progress. The UK made overseas bribery illegal in 2002, under US pressure. Labour ministers subsequently claimed they were determined to stamp out corruption, but in practice no prosecutions have taken place under the new law. …

Synopsis IV: Who Says Pluto Is No Longer a Planet? *Thursday, August 24, 2006 by John Gibson,* FOX NEWS

I saw a headline this morning: Scientists make new discovery. **Pluto** is not a planet. I said to myself, well, even I knew that. Everybody knows. Pluto is a dog. Pluto is a great dog, as a matter of fact. A classic dog, an entertaining dog, a loyal friend to Mickey and Minnie and Donald and Huey, Dewey and Louie. Pluto will always be a dog. Seriously, I know they're talking about Pluto the planet. No. 9. The one way, way out there. Now scientists say Pluto isn't a planet. It isn't big enough. It's something, but not a planet exactly. My attitude is: Who says? It's been a planet my entire life. I learned that in the third grade. Might be the only thing I remember from the third grade. It's the cold one, the farthest from the sun and, yes, it's the small one. But no, you can't unmake Pluto as a planet. Long ago I learned it was a planet and I see no reason to unlearn it. Why should I? Somebody somewhere, some mysterious person who answers to no one and seems to have dictatorial power sets new standards for planets and all of a sudden one of the original nine is dropped? All of a sudden **Ringo** isn't a Beatle? All of a sudden somebody changes a standard and Curly isn't a stooge, or **Zeppo** isn't a Marx, or Ari isn't one of the "**Entourage**"? Actually I don't know why Pluto got itself unmade as a planet. I didn't even read the rest of the story, frankly. The headline was all I needed to see to know I'm rejecting this attempt at revisionist history. That's My Word. End

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What are evaluations for?

As the definition of evaluation implies, it is usually intended to play accountability as well as a learning role. But is it possible to fulfil both roles? Evaluation as an investigative process often seeks to attribute responsibility and blame which may not be conducive to lesson-learning. In contrast, participatory and facilitated evaluations are often seen as a more appropriate style for lesson-learning. At best, the tension between accountability and lesson-learning functions can be a creative one. At worst, one objective dominates and it is impossible to fulfil both roles.

Some characteristics of accountability-oriented versus lesson-learning oriented evaluations

Characteristic	***Accountability-oriented***	***Lesson-learning oriented***
Terms of reference	Likely to be set by those external to the programme	Likely to be set by those directly involved in the programme
Team membership	Independent external team	Internal team of employees, or mixed team of employees and independent members
Emphasis in approach	Methodology of data collection and analysis emphasised – more objective	Process of reflection and reaching conclusions emphasised – more subjective
Style of management	More directive	More facilitative
Circulation of report	In public domain	Internal to organisation/ restricted

There is a spectrum of 'evaluation activity' from internal lesson-learning reviews to independently commissioned evaluations. A number of agencies are now adopting 'After Action Reviews', which are usually internal processes, often managed by a neutral facilitator. For example, US OFDA have started to hold After Action Reviews, learning from the US military. The rule is 'no attribution, no retribution'.

Key references:

ALNAP, 2001, 'Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation'. *ALNAP Annual Review 2001*, London: ODI

ALNAP, 2002, 'Humanitarian Action: Improving Performance through Improved Learning'. *ALNAP Annual Review 2002*. London: ODI

Sexton, R., and McConnan, I., 2003, 'A Comparative Study of After Action Reviews in the Context of the Southern Africa Crisis', *ALNAP Key Messages*

Accountability and quality initiatives in humanitarian assistance

Table taken from: 'Uncertain power: the changing role of official donors in humanitarian action', *HPG Report 12*, ODI, December 2002

Initiative	Date	Origin	Key features
Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief	1994	Formulated by the IFRC and other NGO representatives	States basic principles and standards of behaviour. Hundreds of signatories
Sphere Project	Started in 1996 Humanitarian Charter & Minimum Standards published in 2000	Developed by a coalition of European & US NGOs	Provides a Humanitarian Charter. Sets minimum standards and key indicators for disaster assistance in five sectors. Currently under evaluation
People In Aid	Started in 1996. People In Aid Code of Best Practice published in 1997.	Established by a group of UK organisations	Sets standards for the management & support of aid personnel. Verified by social audit of signatory agencies
ALNAP	1997	Supported by a wide range of agencies (donors, UN, NGOs, Red Cross movement etc), and hosted by ODI	Inter-agency forum to link different initiatives on learning and accountability, and to undertake complementary activities
Humanitarian Ombudsman	1997	Concept developed by a group of UK organisations	Explored how a Humanitarian Ombudsman might act as an impartial and independent voice for people affected by emergencies
HAP	2000	Developed out of the Humanitarian Ombudsman project, to become an international project based in Geneva	Dedicated to improving accountability within the humanitarian sector, initially through a programme of action-research
Quality platform	2000	Developed by French NGOs opposed to Sphere	Designed to raise awareness that there is disagreement over Sphere, and to explore alternative approaches
Country-specific codes	Periodic, from approx. mid-1990s onwards, for example in Liberia, DRC and Sierra Leone	Usually drawing on 1994 Code of Conduct	Usually to ensure humanitarian organisations are working to the same principles, and to guide behaviour. Occasionally to secure agreement of warring parties to standards and principles

Evaluation Types

(These are not all mutually exclusive):

Thematic	One theme, such as gender or environment, across a number of projects or country programmes, or across the organisation as a whole. Often called cross-cutting evaluations undertaken to develop or refine policy.
Sector	Aid to a particular sector, such as health or public nutrition. As with thematic evaluations, these cover a number of projects and country programmes.
Sector Programme	Sector or programme aid to a particular country.
Self	Short one or two-day exercise managed from within the operation to review lessons learned, perhaps using an external facilitator.
Real time	Involves the deployment of a staff member or consultant into an ongoing operation to evaluate events as they unfold.
Process	An evaluation of the internal dynamics of the implementing organisations, i.e., their policy instruments, their service delivery mechanisms, their management practices, and the linkages between these.
Country Programme	All types of aid (project and non-project) to one country.
Synthesis	A synthesis of the findings from a number of evaluations of individual projects or programmes.
Joint	Conducted jointly with the partner or other donors.
Impact	Focuses on the impact of the aid, rather than on aid delivery. Usually, but not always, carried out some time after project completion.
Participatory	Evaluation carried out with, or by, the primary stakeholders, usually the project beneficiaries.
Policy	Examines the framework of understanding, beliefs and assumptions that make individual projects possible as well as desirable. Policy evaluations seek out the inherent tensions or contradictions in policy objectives through tools such as discourse analysis.

Source: DAC (2001) *Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management Terms* DCD/DAC/EV (2001)3 Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Paris: OECD

Joint evaluations: a growing trend within the humanitarian aid sector?[8]

There have only been two system-wide joint evaluations in the humanitarian aid sector to date: the multi-donor Rwanda evaluation in 1996 and the recent Tsunami Evaluation Coalition in 2005/06. However, there appears to be a growing trend towards joint evaluations with the debate focussed less on 'whether' there should be a joint evaluation after a major emergency, and more on 'how' it should be managed.

A simple categorisation of joint evaluations to date is provided by Niels Dabelstein:

- *Classic joint evaluations:* Participation is open to all stakeholder agencies. All partners participate and contribute actively and on equal terms. Examples include: the Rwanda Evaluation, and the Tsunami evaluation.
- *Qualified joint evaluations:* Participation is open only to those who qualify, through membership of a certain grouping (e.g., DAC, EU, Nordics) or through active participation in the activity (e.g., jointly-implemented programmes) that is being evaluated.
- *Framework Evaluations:* Participating organisations agree on a common evaluation framework. Responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is then devolved to different partners resulting in individual case evaluations and a synthesis report. An example is the joint IDP evaluation.

At a recent ALNAP meeting, participants identified the following reasons for and against doing joint evaluations.

Reasons for doing joint evaluations:

- Broader scope: answers questions that cannot be addressed by one actor alone, such as coordination and coherence; also enables sensitive issues to be addressed.
- Objectivity and legitimacy: increased weight of the evaluation if it is undertaken with partners.
- Advocacy tool: opportunity to influence at the highest level, and can contribute to ongoing reform initiatives
- Rigour: joint evaluations generally demand a higher water mark of rigour than single agency evaluations.
- Attribution: it is usually easier to capture attribution in a joint evaluation.
- Efficiency: rationalisation, harmonisation and reduced transaction costs for all partners (except the lead agency).
- Participation and alignment between agencies: there is an opportunity for peer review and peer learning.
- Evaluation capacity: it is a way of developing evaluation capacity within the sector.
- Beneficiary voice: opportunities for doing large beneficiary surveys are usually greater in joint evaluations than single agency ones.
- Social capital: builds social capital amongst the agencies involved

[8] Based on presentations and discussions at a half-day workshop on joint evaluations, at the ALNAP Biannual meeting in Rome in December 2006.

Reasons against doing joint evaluations:

- Complexity: can hamper joint evaluations of humanitarian assistance.
- Lack of agreed common standards: this can get in the way of joint evaluation within the humanitarian sector.
- Time: it takes much longer to plan and execute joint vs single agency evaluations.
- Management: it requires a complicated management structure to work.
- Transaction costs: these are usually higher for participating agencies (especially for the lead agency) compared with single agency evaluations, although this needs to be balanced against the value that participating agencies gain from the exercise.
- Focus of recommendations: need to guard against inadequately targeted recommendations which can reduce their impact.
- Detail required for a single agency: a joint evaluation may not provide the detail required to fulfil accountability requirements on the part of a single agency.

EXERCISE – stakeholder mapping

The case study

You have just joined an international NGO as 'Director of Humanitarian Assistance'. The NGO has its roots in community-based development, but is slowly building up its capacity, experience and credibility in emergencies. In the last two years the organisation has been running its largest ever emergency operation – providing logistical support (building temporary roads, tankering water etc) to a major refugee camp. It has been doing this in partnership with a not-for-profit logistics company, funded by USAID, DFID and the NGO's own supporters in the general public. You want to launch an evaluation to learn from this experience and to feed into the agency's future strategy for humanitarian action that you have been asked to lead in the first year.

Your brief

1) Who are the principal stakeholders for this evaluation?

2) Which do you identify as the **primary** stakeholders? (You can illustrate this by mapping the stakeholders spatially on a piece of flipchart paper).

If time:

3) How do you want them to be using the evaluation findings?

Stakeholder Mapping for EHA

Stakeholder	***Significance to evaluation and evaluation use***	***Characteristics***	***Interests and expectations in the programme***	***Interests and expectations in the evaluation***	***Involvement in evaluation design and preparation***	***Involvement during evaluation***	***To be targeted with which outputs and formats***	***Role and involvement in follow-up***
Beneficiaries								
Affected pop. Not direct beneficiaries								
Sections of the organisation being evaluated								
Staff of the organisation being evaluated								
Partner organisations								
National authorities								
Local authorities								
Agencies working in same area/sector								
Co-ordinating organisations								
Funding organisations								
Supporters								
General Public								
Media								
Other								

Potential advantages and disadvantages of internal and external evaluators

Advantages of using Internal evaluators

- Know the organisation
- Understand organisational behaviour and attitudes
- Are known to staff
- Are less threatening
- Often a greater chance of adopting recommendations
- Are less expensive
- Build internal evaluation capability
- Contribute to programme capacity

Disadvantages of using internal evaluators

- Objectivity may be questioned
- Structure may constrain participation
- Personal gain may be questioned
- Accept the assumptions of the organisation
- Full participation may be constrained by usual workload
- May not be trained in evaluation methods
- May lack special technical expertise
- May lead to the evaluation not having acceptable outside credibility
- May have difficulty avoiding bias

Advantages of using External evaluators

- Objective
- No organisational bias
- Fresh perspectives
- Broader experience
- More easily hired for longer periods of time

- Can serve as an outside expert
- Not part of the power structure
- Can bring in additional resources
- Trained in evaluation
- Experienced in other evaluations
- Regarded as an ‘expert’

Disadvantages of using External evaluators

- May not know the organisation
- May not know of constraints affecting recommendations
- May be perceived as an adversary
- Expensive
- Contract negotiations may take time
- Follow up on recommendations is not always there
- Unfamiliar with environment

Timing of an Evaluation – Practical considerations

When scheduling evaluations, consider the seasons and work cycles:

- The rainy season
- Harvest time
- The end of the fiscal year
- Public holidays and festivals
- Political events

Scheduling also may affect the findings:

- Malnutrition and certain diseases
- Weighing children in winter months, with many clothes on
- Availability of range of beneficiaries to interview e.g. migration patterns

Functions of Terms of Reference

The TOR represent agreed expectations in terms of:

- Scope and parameters
- Process (including timing)
- Role of each key stakeholder
- Obligations of evaluation team, and of other stakeholders
- Key questions to be answered

The TOR provides a formal record of agreement as to what will be done. They are just as important for internal teams as for external teams (although TOR for external teams may require more detail on background context and on intended audiences and uses).

NB. The TOR are a critical tool for linking the evaluation's design with its intended use (but this is often overlooked in the planning phase!)

Terms of Reference (TOR) Content

Detailed terms of reference generally include:

- The reasons for the evaluation and its objectives (why evaluate).
- A statement of the scope and specific issues to be addressed (what to evaluate – policy, programme, operation, issue).
- Objectives – the extent to which the evaluation is expected to provide accurate measures of impact and contribute to accountability should be carefully considered.
- The questions to be answered (criteria or focus) and tasks to be carried out, including, if possible, what information is to be collected and how.
- The locations to be visited (where); access to information and people.
- Which people are responsible for which tasks (who) – to what extent is the evaluation independent?
- A statement of the expected output & style of the report.
- A timetable (when to evaluate) indicating when various tasks will be completed as well as the due dates and recipients of any periodic reports or outlines. The TOR should specify that an initial report will be submitted in draft and provide time for corrections or changes to the draft once it has been reviewed.
- A budget indicating the costs associated with the evaluation.
- What happens after the evaluation (follow up, ownership).

Other issues to be considered:

- Need to consider translation of TOR for in-country use by evaluators.
- The evaluation team often draws up a detailed work plan of the evaluation, once the TOR has been decided on.

(Adapted from: Planning and Organising Useful Evaluations. UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service, January 1998)

Sample Terms of Reference (TOR)

The following is a sample TOR. It may be helpful as a model outline. Areas which could have been covered explicitly are, however: an indication of how the report will be used and provisions for follow-up action.

Disasters Emergency Committee TOR for the Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds

Background

Around 8th February 2000, Mozambique, one of the world's poorest countries, suffered its worst floods for half a century. Following the unusually heavy rains over the region and the tropical storms that accompanied cyclones Connie and Eline, hundreds of square miles around the Limpopo and Save river basins were left under water, with hundreds of thousands of people homeless and at risk.

The Mozambique Government estimated that up to 1 million people had been affected with hundreds feared dead. Overwhelmed by the devastation it appealed to the international community for assistance.

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) is a UK charity which launches and co-ordinates a National Appeal in response to a major disaster overseas. It brings together a unique alliance of aid, corporate, public and broadcasting sector services to rally compassion and ensure that funds raised go to those amongst its fourteen UK member aid agencies best placed to bring effective and timely relief. DEC agencies have been present in Mozambique for many years working directly or supporting local partners.

The DEC 'Mozambique Floods Appeal' was launched on 2nd March 2000. To date, the appeal has generated some £20m pooled funds to be disbursed to the 11 DEC agencies participating in the appeal. These funds are supporting activities in: search and rescue; water and sanitation; food aid; medicine and health care; clothing and household items; shelter and housing; seeds and tools etc *(see Appendix 2 for summary of agencies' activities and locations)*. There will be an initial nine-month expenditure period following the launch of this appeal, during which participating agencies will have access to a pre-determined share of pooled appeal funds *(see Appendix 1 for summary of disbursement shares)*. Participating agencies will submit a 'Final Declaration of Expenditure' reports in the tenth month following the launch.

DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds. This provides an important mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public. Evaluation also enables DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good-practice in response to humanitarian emergencies. The final report will be made public on completion of the evaluation.

Main purpose of the evaluation

To provide independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC-funded responses following the Mozambique floods.

Appropriateness

Were assessments undertaken appropriate to identification of need? Were the actions undertaken appropriate in the context of the needs of the affected population and the context in which the agencies

were operating? Was sufficient attention given to the identification of clear objectives and activities that would ensure objectives were met?

Was the assistance appropriate in relation to the customs and practices of the affected population?

To what extent were potential and actual beneficiaries consulted as to their perceived needs and priorities? What was the level of beneficiary involvement in project design, implementation and monitoring? How effective and appropriate were these processes in ensuring relevant and timely project delivery in support of the most needy and vulnerable?

Was the assistance provided in a timely manner?

Efficiency

Were resources used efficiently? For instance, were more expensive forms of response (such as air transport) used longer than was necessary? Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more effective and less costly responses?

Impact

What direct and indirect evidence is available that the action taken contributed to the reduction of mortality, morbidity and suffering and that the affected population was assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and livelihoods? In the absence of much baseline data, it is suggested this might best be measured against the level of satisfaction of beneficiaries and their perception of appropriateness and effectiveness of the response.

What systems or indicators did agencies use to evaluate the effectiveness of their work?

Coverage

Was DEC assistance provided to all major population groups facing life-threatening situations?

What efforts were made to ensure that particular populations, vulnerable groups and areas were not overlooked?

Were beneficiaries correctly and fairly identified and targeted?

Connectedness

Was the assistance provided in a way that took account of the longer-term context?

Did the assistance seek to strengthen the capacity of local agencies and personnel?

Coherence

What steps were taken by participating agencies to ensure their responses were co-ordinated with each other and with other humanitarian agencies?

Were other actions, such as advocacy work, undertaken by the member agencies to complement their immediate relief actions?

These criteria take into account 'standard' evaluation questions, and also reflect the DEC's Objective, the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct and those disaster response objectives of DEC member agencies that are broadly shared. Thus, objectives such as achieving a co-ordinated response, ensuring that relief activities take account of longer-term considerations and that the capacity of local organisations and personnel is strengthened during the response, are explicitly included in the criteria.

Following the field visits the evaluation team should be in a position to comment on the adequacy of management, accounting, monitoring and reporting processes of the DEC agencies and their field-level partners. They should also be able to comment on the key constraints that affected the DEC supported programs, and how the different DEC agencies dealt with them.

Specific Issues for Consideration

- What was the added value of DEC appeal funds in the context of the overall humanitarian response? Did DEC funds facilitate a quick response?

- Was gender considered in the agencies' emergency assessments? Did relief provision include special components for women and, if so, were these systematically monitored?

- Were the special needs of acute vulnerable groups (e.g. children/elderly/disabled etc) considered in the agencies' emergency assessments and were they consulted in the same way as other groups? Did relief provision include special components for them and if so were these appropriate and systematically monitored?

- Did the response of the DEC agencies strengthen and complement the response of local organisations and coping mechanisms, or hinder them?

- What was the level of co-operation in the field? Could more have been done to help improve the effectiveness of DEC agencies' responses in terms of co-ordination, joint-logistics, communications packages, and information flows between the key relief players?

- Was there appropriate geographical coverage within the affected region?

- To what extent did responses reflect lessons-learned from previous flood disasters?

- To what extent did the DEC agencies' limited involvement in 'search & rescue' and the difficulties around transport affect the impact of the DEC funded response? The evaluation team is requested to dedicate one section of the final evaluation report to this issue.

Method

Participating DEC agencies are required to submit the following material (in both hard copy and electronic format) to the Secretariat to assist the evaluation team's work:

- a summary chronology

- key documents on the agency's response to the emergency and their use of DEC funds - e.g. '48 Hour Plan of Action'; '4 Week Plan of Action'.

- names, contact details and roles during the response of key agency and partner personnel in the head office and in the relevant field offices.

- List of indicators used by the agencies to monitor and evaluate their DEC funded activities.

The Secretariat will prepare a package of materials on each participating agency to be given to the evaluation team, as well as minutes of appeal related decision-making meetings – e.g. decision to appeal; decision to extend/reduce the period of joint action; decisions affecting DEC rules governing appeals.

The evaluation team will begin with a review of available documentation.

The evaluation team will be responsible for ensuring appropriate data-collection is undertaken in the field following their appointment, so that key information, that may no longer be available in the later stage of the DEC funded response, is not lost to the evaluation process.

Following submission of DEC agencies' '10th Month Declaration of Expenditure' reports, member(s) of the evaluation team will visit the head office of each participating agency to undertake interviews and collect and review supplementary documentation. Evaluators should be allowed full access to relevant files. The schedule of the subsequent fieldwork will be discussed during these visits. Since certain operations will already have closed down by the time the evaluation proper is underway, it will be appropriate to undertake preliminary fieldwork during the expenditure period. The evaluation team's schedule, accommodation and transport arrangements will be finalised and communicated to the Secretariat and all agencies at least one week prior to any visit.

In the field the evaluation team will seek to spend a period with each agency that is roughly proportional to the share of DEC pooled funds received by each agency. During their work the evaluators will fill out the chronology of decisions and actions so as to understand the context and the level of information that was available to the agency in deciding on a particular action. During their time with each agency the team will interview key personnel remaining in-country (contacting others prior to the field visits or on their return) and undertake visits to selected project sites/areas. The field visit must include at least one DEC funded project for each participating agency. The evaluators will have to make extensive use of agency reports and their own preliminary data collection, where later site visits would prove pointless. It should be noted that in the case of agencies that are part of larger organisations UK assistance might not be distinguishable from that of global counterparts, nevertheless, every effort should be made to distinguish DEC funding.

As well as interviewing the agencies' project officers, key officials in co-ordinating agencies (e.g. UNICEF, OCHA, central and state governments), and partner agencies, a sample of beneficiaries will be selected and interviewed by the evaluators. These interviews will be conducted without agency personnel being present, using interpreters (where necessary) hired directly by the evaluation team. The beneficiaries will be questioned on their views of the assistance provided, the way they were selected and their overall views of the agency. Interviews with individuals may be complemented by discussions with groups of beneficiaries. So as to assess the agency's targeting and beneficiary selection methods the evaluation team will also interview a selection of potential beneficiaries who did not receive assistance.

It is expected that the evaluation team will use gender-aware and participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non-beneficiaries. Inclusive techniques will be expected of the evaluators, to seek active participation in the evaluation by members of local emergency committees, staff of implementing partner agencies and member agencies, and representatives of local and central governments.

Agencies' '10^{th} Month Declaration of Expenditure' reports will be examined to assess direct and indirect project costs, and, in conjunction with beneficiary/team assessment of direct and indirect benefits, and to compare the cost-effectiveness of different approaches.

The evaluation will be undertaken with due reference to the Red Cross/Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct, which all agencies have signed. Reference should also be made to the Sphere Standards.

Before leaving the country, members of the team will indicate their broad findings to Country Representative and senior staff of each agency and note their comments.

A meeting should then be held in London to disseminate a draft report of the evaluation. The report should be circulated one week prior to the workshop to allow for preliminary review by agencies and their partners, and followed by a two-week formal agency comment period.

The evaluation team should allow for a follow-up workshop in-country within a month of the release of the final evaluation report. The aim of this workshop will be to discuss the evaluation recommendations and major lessons of the Mozambique floods, and how agencies might seek to implement. It is suggested that participants include UK, regional, and in-country representatives from the agencies and their implementing partners, and other key stakeholders as appropriate.

The Report

The evaluation report should consist of:

- executive summary and recommendations (not more than six pages)
- main text, to include index, emergency context, evaluation methodology, appeal management, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issue of particular lesson-learning focus, conclusions (not more than thirty pages)
- appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, summary of agency activities, sub-team report(s), end notes (where appropriate) and bibliography. (All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Secretariat prior to termination of the contract)

Evaluation team and timeframe

It is anticipated there will be a core team of at least three people, with others drawn in as necessary. The Team Leader should have a relevant skill and a proven background in emergency evaluations. The appropriate balance of professional and analytical skills amongst the remaining team members should be determined following a preliminary examination of agency activities. It is likely, however, that sector expertise in areas such as water and sanitation, public health and shelter will be required. At least one person from the region should be included in the team that makes the field visits.

All team members should be gender aware, and a reasonable gender balance within field teams is desirable.

Consultants or independent evaluation teams short-listed in the tendering process should seek DEC approval for any proposed changes to the composition of the team originally submitted.

The evaluation timeframe should allow for the circulation of a first draft by early March 2001, followed by presentation of the draft by the evaluation consultant(s) to member agencies a week later. A formal comment period, of at least two weeks, for participating agencies and their partners will then follow. The completion date for the Final Evaluation Report will be 15th April 2001, the consultants having addressed agencies' comments as appropriate.

Tenders and Evaluation Management

Tenders should be submitted to the DEC Secretariat by the closing date of 15th May 2000. A maximum 5 page summary should be submitted with appendices of team member CVs (each CV a maximum of 3 pages) and an indication of availability. The DEC may wish to see substantive pieces work or to take up references of short-listed consultants.

The final decision on tenders will be taken by the DEC Executive Committee, following short-listing and interviews. Key factors will include:

Provisional framework, methodology, team balance, local experiences, distinctive competencies, timeframe and budget, an appreciation of key constraints and comments on the above terms of reference.

Professionalism of the bid, team experience (professional and analytical), degree of parity with the terms of reference, likelihood of achieving the DEC timetable, and realism not just competitiveness in the cost submission.

Tenders will be accepted from “freelance” teams as well as from company, PVO or academic teams. Tenders are particularly welcome from regional teams.

Administration and overall co-ordination, including monitoring progress, lies with the DEC Secretariat. The evaluation Team Leader must, from the commencement of the evaluation, submit a weekly report on actual against anticipated progress. The Steering Committee (DEC Operations Sub-Committee) will via the Secretariat undertake to respond to weekly submissions as necessary. In addition, the Team Leader should alert the Secretariat immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval for any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be referred to the Steering Committee.

Evaluating Protection

Four Modes of Protective Practice

Denunciation is pressuring authorities through public disclosure into fulfilling their obligation and protecting individuals or groups exposed to abuse**;**

Persuasion is convincing the authorities through more private dialogue to fulfil their obligations and protect individuals and groups exposed to violations;

Substitution is directly providing services or material assistance to the victims of violations**;**

Support to structures is empowering existing national and/or local structures through project-oriented aid to enable them to carry out their functions to protect individuals and groups**.**

Sectorally-based Protective Assistance

***Aid as protection**

In themselves, the provision of healthcare, water, sanitation, food security, livelihood support and psychosocial programming can play an enormous part in the practical protection of civilians who have suffered from massive violations of their rights in war. Such programmes are usually based directly on aid as a substitution for state provision or support to state services. They can help people realise their social and economic rights in war and help them recover their personal dignity.

***Aid as Protective**

If aid can help to ensure people's immediate protection, it can also help to keep people safe. Used strategically protective assistance can function preventively to protect people actively from further attacks.

> **Every humanitarian programme of protective assistance for past violations should also be designed with a protective edge that consciously seeks to prevent future violations**.

As much as possible, all humanitarian aid programmes need to 'think safety' and focus on ways in which their sectoral programming can reduce people's vulnerability to attack and violation.

Taken from Alnap guidance booklet *Humanitarian Protection*, pilot version 2004, H Slim, Luis Enrique Eguren

Types of questions that could be included in TOR to cover protection:

What modes of protective practice did the organisation adopt at various stages of the humanitarian response? With what effect?

How well did the programming team understand the affected population's coping mechanisms, its will and capacities for self-protection and organisation?

What methods were used to assess violence against women throughout the programme cycle?

How was the agency's presence targeted to get close to particular groups of vulnerable people at particular high-risk times and in high-risk places?

How much are existing guidelines on protection disseminated within the organisation concerned i.e. UNHCR guidelines to counter sexual violence?

How aware were staff and field partners as to how to refer women and men seeking redress for human rights violations? How able were staff to link people's experiences of violations to specific legal standards?

What specific steps were taken to ensure and increase personal safety and security of women, girls, boys and men?

What measures were put in place regarding accommodation, transportation and security to enable women workers to do their jobs as safely as possible?

How much did staff include humanitarian values and principles in educational programmes in health promotion, schools and literacy groups?

Other useful sources of information:

- Growing the Sheltering Tree, - protecting rights through humanitarian action, IASC.
- www.ICVA.ch NGO Statement on International protection 4 July 2003
- Protecting Refugees: A Field Guide for NGOs. UNHCR

Main Evaluation Criteria definitions

From the ALNAP EHA guide, 2006

Effectiveness

'Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is timeliness.'

Efficiency

'**Efficiency** measures the outputs — qualitative and quantitative — achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.'

Relevance/Appropriateness

'Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy).' **'Appropriateness** is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly.'

Impact (including sustainability)

'Impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, environmental – on individuals, gender and age-groups, communities, and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household).'

Summary Definitions

- **Effectiveness** (achieving objectives - *doing the thing right*)
- **Efficiency** (doing it right, with as few resources as possible; *Effort, time, money, people, materials*)
- **Relevance/Appropriateness** (*doing the right thing*)
- **Impact** (*doing the right thing,* changing the situation more profoundly and in the longer-term)

Additional Criteria:

Coverage (may be linked to effectiveness)

'The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening risk wherever they are.' Evaluators piloting the ALNAP Guide had differing opinions as to whether coverage should

be a separate criterion, or included in 'effectiveness'. For the time being it has been included as a separate criterion, with the links to effectiveness made clear in this Section.

Sustainability (which may be linked to longer-term impact) 'is concerned with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. … many humanitarian interventions, in contrast to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable. They still need assessing, however, in regard to whether, in responding to acute and immediate needs, they take the longer-term into account. Larry Minear has referred to this as **Connectedness**, the need "to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account".[3]'

Coherence (may be linked to 'effectiveness' and 'Impact'): 'The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all **policies** take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations.'

[3] Minear, L. (1994).

Exercise: Frameworks and Scenarios

Task (10 minutes in pairs or threes)

Please indicate in which EHA scenario you would choose to apply the following frameworks and be ready to say why. Please match each framework with a corresponding scenario by noting a scenario number in the box beside each framework.

Please note that:

- **Though you are asked to match each framework with only one scenario**, options are not mutually exclusive. Though scenarios are designed to match at least one framework particularly well, in reality frameworks may fit more than one of the listed scenarios. Equally, in reality, evaluators might apply more than one framework to each scenario, to evaluate distinct components, levels or aspects of whatever is being evaluated.

- Frameworks not listed here may be as, or more appropriate for the scenarios, depending on the various contexts. **The aim of the exercise is, however, to show in a simplified manner how certain frameworks may be more appropriate than others for specific EHA scenarios and to draw out the elements one might consider in choosing frameworks for an EHA.**

Framework	**Scenario no.**
1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child	
2. The Sphere Project Handbook	
3. Guidelines for addressing and preventing Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGVB)	
4. The Good Humanitarian Donorship principles (GHD)	
5. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct	
6. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights	
7. The HAP-I accountability principles	
8. The UN (Francis Deng) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement	
9. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters	
10. The 1951 Refugee Convention	

Framework	Scenario no.
11. The national nutrition protocol and guidelines	
12. WFP emergencies handbook	
13. The 'Do no Harm' framework	
14. OECD/DAC Poverty Reduction principles and guidelines	

Scenarios for an EHA

1. Comprehensive, integrated programmes to address the needs of Colombian IDPs during the full cycle of their displacement and related solutions

2. The procurement, transport and delivery of food for IDPs and returning refugees in Afghanistan

3. Emergency response activities to address the basic survival needs of refugees and IDPs fleeing violence in the DR Congo

4. Programme for Unaccompanied Minors demobilising from the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda

5. NGO responses to the on-going Darfur, Sudan crisis

6. Official funding in response to the Indian Ocean tsunamis disaster

7. Assistance for refugees and IDPs returning to mixed-ethnic areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina

8. Activities advocating for respect for the basic Human Rights of peoples living in Palestine

9. An Indian Ocean tsunami livelihoods recovery project

10. An examination of an agency's compliance with accountability principles and standards to which it has formally subscribed

11. The West Africa 'sex-for-food' abuse case

12. The programme to 'evacuate' to third countries Serbian Kosovars who had fled into Macedonia, in 1999

13. Feeding programmes for victims of chronic food shortages in Ethiopia

14. A capacity building programme for micro-seismic mapping and related vulnerability assessments for hospitals in Latin America

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The RC Code of Conduct

Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes

1 The humanitarian imperative comes first

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2 Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone

Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

3 Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint

Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4 We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy

NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We will never knowingly – or through negligence – allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.

5 We shall respect culture and custom

We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.

6 We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities

All people and communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.

7 Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid

Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be

achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.

8 Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs

All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9 We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources

We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.

10 In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While we will cooperate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance. We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.

The Working Environment

Having agreed unilaterally to strive to abide by the Code laid out above, we present below some indicative guidelines which describe the working environment we would like to see created by donor governments, host governments and the inter-governmental organisations – principally the agencies of the United Nations – in order to facilitate the effective participation of NGHAs in disaster response. These guidelines are presented for guidance. They are not legally binding, nor do we expect governments and IGOs to indicate their acceptance of the guidelines through the signature of any document, although this may be a goal to work to in the future. They are presented in a spirit of openness and cooperation so that our partners will become aware of the ideal relationship we would seek with them.

Annex I: Recommendations to the governments of disaster-affected countries

1 Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs

NGHAs are independent bodies. This independence and impartiality should be respected by host governments.

2 Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for NGHAs

If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should be granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims, for the purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising of sovereign responsibility, not to block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and apolitical action of NGHAs. Host governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by waiving requirements for transit, entry and exit visas, or arranging that these are rapidly granted. Governments should grant over-flight permission and landing rights for aircraft transporting international relief supplies and personnel, for the duration of the emergency relief phase.

3 Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during disasters

Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to requirements for consular certificates of origin or invoices, import and/or export licences or other restrictions, or to importation taxation, landing fees or port charges.

The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host government through the temporary waiving of licence or registration restrictions. Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end of a relief operation.

To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate certain radio frequencies, which relief organisations may use in-country and for international communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make such frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster. They should authorise relief personnel to utilise all means of communication required for their relief operations.

4 Governments should seek to provide a coordinated disaster information and planning service

The overall planning and coordination of relief efforts is ultimately the responsibility of the host government. Planning and coordination can be greatly enhanced if NGHAs are provided with information on relief needs and government systems for planning and implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks they may encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs. To facilitate effective coordination and the efficient utilisation of relief efforts, host governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point-of-contact for incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities.

5 Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict

In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

Annex II: Recommendations to donor governments

1 Donor governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs

NGHAs are independent bodies whose independence and impartiality should be respected by donor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs to further any political or ideological aim.

2 Donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence

NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same spirit as they render it to disaster victims; one

of humanity and independence of action. The implementation of relief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHA and will be carried out according to the policies of that NGHA.

3 Donor governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining access to disaster victims

Donor governments should recognise the importance of accepting a level of responsibility for the security and freedom of access of NGHA staff to disaster sites. They should be prepared to exercise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if necessary.

Annex III: Recommendations to intergovernmental organisations

1 IGOs should recognise NGHAs, local and foreign, as valuable partners

NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other inter-governmental agencies to effect better disaster response. They do so in a spirit of partnership which respects the integrity and independence of all partners. Inter-governmental agencies must respect the independence and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN agencies in the preparation of relief plans.

2 IGOs should assist host governments in providing an overall coordinating framework for international and local disaster relief

NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall coordinating framework for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls to the host government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to provide this service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected state and the national and international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should make all efforts to ensure the effective coordination of their own services. In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

3 IGOs should extend security protection provided for UN organisations to NGHAs

Where security services are provided for inter-governmental organisations, this service should be extended to their operational NGHA partners where it is so requested.

4 IGOs should provide NGHAs with the same access to relevant information as is granted to UN organisations

IGOs are urged to share all information, pertinent to the implementation of effective disaster response, with their operational

NGHA partners.

The RC Code of Conduct and DAC Criteria

The following is an ad hoc linking of the RC Code of Conduct principles with standard DAC evaluation criteria.

Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes

1 The humanitarian imperative comes first (Humanitarian Imperative: Relevance)

2 Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone (Impartiality and need: Relevance)

3 Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint

(Unconditional aid: Impact and Relevance)

4 We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy (Independence: Impact and Relevance)

5 We shall respect culture and custom (Respect for cultures: Effectiveness, Impact)

6 We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities (Build on local capacities: Effectiveness, Impact, Efficiency)

7 Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid (Participation: Effectiveness, Relevance)

8 Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs (Vulnerability Reduction: Impact and Relevance)

9 We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources (Accountability: Impact and Relevance)

10 In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects (Disaster victims as dignified humans: Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance)

***

Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)

Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003 by Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.

Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.

2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

General principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.

5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.

6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.

7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.

9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and

return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.

10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

(a) Funding

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.

12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations

13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.

14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.

16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.

17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.

18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.

19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.

20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

(c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.

22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.

23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting

‘Log-Frame’ or ‘Lock-Frame’?



(Cartoon which appeared on an IFAD website regarding the use of logframes)

The following is from: "LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS": PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS
by Des Gasper (undated, but probably 1999) downloaded from
http://winelands.sun.ac.za/2001/Papers/Gasper,%20Des.htm on December 28, 2006

The conventional logframe has assumed simple project systems, with simple causal structures and additive, separable external influences; plus simple, pyramidal, normative structures. The record of this impressively versatile, but highly simplifying, model is very mixed. LFA has a range of potentials, good and bad. Outcomes depend on which aspects are emphasised, on how intelligently and in what conditions LFs are employed, and whose servant they become. Figure 2 summarises arguments from earlier sections (of the referenced paper). To compensate for imbalance in the existing literature it highlights important problems and dangers to be prepared against.

THE LFA	OBJECTIVES AND POTENTIAL STRENGTHS	COMMON PROBLEMS	DANGERS
About vertical logic	1) A synoptic, integrated view-- relatively thorough yet concise--of project objectives and activities and their links to environments 2) Distinguishes stages/ levels in temporal sequences and value hierarchies 3) Encourages examination of interconnections and assumptions 4) Encourages attention to wider significance and justifiability	a) In clarifying and gaining consensus on objectives b) In interpreting and applying the terms for different levels c1) In linking activities to higher goals in one diagram c2) Obscure time dimension d) In reducing objectives to a means-ends chain e) In trying to define only one Purpose and Goal f) Neglect of assumptions analysis h) In understanding causation; interpreting meaning of the links	i) Hides disagreement; imposes views of a power-centre ii) Overlap of different levels. Tautology and success-by-definition. iii) 'Jamming' and over-aggregation, especially at higher levels iv) Neglect of process values v) Oversimplification of objectives and design vi) Ritual of validation by superficial assumptions analysis. vii) Neglect of alternatives; rigidification of design viii) Ignoring or downgrading unintended effects
About horizontal logic	1) To give measurable, operationalised reference-points for use in appraisal, management, & evaluation 2) To deepen examination of meanings of objectives	a) To obtain practicable, valid, quantified indicators, especially for higher levels and for 'social' types of project b) To separate out the influences of complementary factors c) To balance standardization of monitoring with retention of its 'intelligence' function	i1) Downgrading of less quantifiable objectives; ii2) excessive focus on lower levels ii) Confusion of indicators & targets ii) Invalid use of gross outcomes as indicators; mis-handling co-determined effects iv) Fetishization of imperfect indicators v) Tunnel-vision

THE LFA	OBJECTIVES AND POTENTIAL STRENGTHS	COMMON PROBLEMS	DANGERS
			vi) Distorted incentives vii) Rigidification, or disproportionate work to find and update adequate indicators & targets
About format and application	1) Visually accessible; relatively easy to understand 2) Shared focus for different parties 3) Matrix can and should be systematically linked to situation analysis 4) Can be applied in a more participatory way	a) Assumptions analysis is physically marginalized b) Pressure to use a pre-set format c) Prepared too late d) Often hard in practice to update e) High demands for training, judgement and motivation, if a simplifying method is to be applied sensibly	i) Distortions if precisely the same format is applied to nearly all cases ii) If a partial summary is fetishized as the whole truth iii) Can deaden thought iv) Can stifle adaptation; lock-frame v) Can exclude those without particular training and styles of thought vi) Can become a method for enforcement of one (dated) view, for one-way accountability only, and thus alienate staff

Frameworks: Danger of over-engineering

In order to reduce the risk of over-engineering both HA and EHA, consult beneficiaries for their 'framework(s)':

Methods: Pointers for good practice

- Ensure that method used is adequately described
- Use a multi-method approach and cross-check where possible
- Assess the intervention against appropriate international standards and law
- Talk to primary stakeholders
- Disaggregate (e.g. by sex, socioeconomic group & ethnicity
- Ensure a focus on social process & causality
- Make clear any evaluator bias

(Reference: ALNAP guide on evaluating humanitarian action, Beck, 2006)

Examples of data collection methods

1. **Literature search**	Economic and efficient way of obtaining information. Difficult to assess validity and reliability on secondary data.
2. **Key informant interviews**	Flexible, in-depth approach. Easy to implement. Risk of biased presentation/ interpretation from informants/ interviewer
3. **Direct measurement**	Registration of quantifiable or classifiable data by means of analytical instrument. Precise, reliable and often requiring few resources. Registers only facts, not explanations.
4. **Direct observation**	Involves inspection, field visits, observation to understand processes, infrastructure/ services and their utilization. Dependent on observer's understanding and interpretation.
5. **Group interviews**	Low-cost, efficient. Direct contact with those affected. Susceptible to manipulation and less suitable for sensitive issues.
6. **Informal survey**	Involves quantitative surveys of small samples. Reasonable and rapid. Risk of sampling errors/ biases. Less suited for generalization
7. **Case studies**	In-depth review of one or a small number of selected cases. Well-suited for understanding processes and for formulating hypotheses to be tested later.
8. **Observation**	In-depth observations over an extended period of time, participatory or non-participatory. Well-suited for understanding processes but with limited potential for generalization.
9. **Formal survey**	Oral interviews or written questionnaires in a representative sample of respondents. Data collection is demanding but often produces reliable information.
10. **Story-telling/ collection**	Obtaining participants' and communities' experiences of change by collating their observations and stories.

(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Danida (2006) 'Evaluation Guidelines')

Data collection methods: some useful distinctions

Quantitative vs qualitative indicators

- Quantitative indicators: indicators that can be measured in numeric terms, usually through scientific techniques such as surveys

- Qualitative indicators: indicators that rely on descriptive data, usually generated through techniques such as focus groups, interviews, PRA techniques

'Formal' vs 'informal' data collection methods

- 'Formal' methods: procedure clearly defined from the outset e.g. formal survey, direct measurement

- 'Informal' methods: less precise procedures. Rely to a large extent on experience, intuition and subjective judgement e.g. focus group interviews, semi-structured interviews

Checklist of questions to ask when selecting evaluation methods:

- Are the methods proposed consistent with the time and resources available for the evaluation?

- Will the methods provide the type and quality of evaluation findings required by the stakeholders?

- Have specific questions or hypotheses relating to each evaluation criteria been generated during the inception stage of the evaluation?

- Will the methods selected by the evaluators provide valid and reliable information, which will allow these questions to be answered?

- Are the methods to be used clearly described in the evaluation proposal?

(Source: Evaluation guidelines, Evaluation Department, DFID, 2000)

Data analysis

‘The purpose of analysis is to transform the data into credible evidence about the development of intervention and its performance. Typically, the analytical process involves three steps:

1. Organising the data for analysis, i.e. data preparation
2. Describing the data, e.g. generating findings of fact
3. Interpreting the data, e.g. assessing the findings against criteria’

(Extract from: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Danida (2006) ‘Evaluation Guidelines’)

Bias

All data collection strategies are subject to the problem of bias. Bias leads to misinterpretation or mistaken analysis that draws its conclusions from information which is not correct, not complete or not representative of the affected population. Anecdotes abound of the effects of bias on evaluation results. To summarise, at a minimum, evaluation resources may be wasted if they are affected by bias. In the worst cases, biased evaluations can cause harm to populations they were meant to help, while also affecting agency reputations. Some forms of bias are the following:

Spatial - Issues of comfort and ease determine the assessment site

Project - The assessor is drawn toward sites where contacts and information is readily available and may have been assessed before by many others

Person - Key informants tend to be those who are in a high position and have the ability to communicate

Season - Assessments are conducted during periods of pleasant weather, or areas cut off by bad weather go unassessed, thus many typical problems go unnoticed

Diplomatic - Selectivity in projects shown to the assessor for diplomatic reasons

Professional - Assessors are too specialised and miss linkages between processes (preceding biases, Chambers, 1983)

Battle - Assessors go only to areas of cease-fire and relative safety. (Barakat and Ellis, 1996)

Political - Informants present information that is skewed toward their political agenda; assessors look for information that fits their political agenda.

Cultural - Incorrect assumptions are based on one's own cultural norms; Assessors do not understand the cultural practices of the affected populations.

Class/ethnic - Needs and resources of different groups are not included in the assessment

Interviewer or Investigator - Tendency to concentrate on information that confirms preconceived notions and hypotheses, causing one to seek consistency too early and overlook evidence inconsistent with earlier findings; Partiality to the opinions of elite key informants.

Key informant - Biases of key informants carried into assessment results

Gender - Assessors only speak to men, or male interviewers survey women, or vice versa.

Mandate or speciality - Agencies assess areas of their competency without an inter-disciplinary or inter-agency approach.

Time of day or schedule bias - The assessment is conducted at a time of day when certain segments of the population may be over- or under-represented.

Sampling - Respondents are not representative of the population.

(Source: *Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines*. A training module prepared for the University of Wisconsin-Madison Disaster Management Center by InterWorks.)

Ethical considerations

Evaluators should aspire to provide high quality information and assessment and to conduct a high quality evaluation process. Ethical considerations are integral to this.

Ethical guidance adapted from that provided by CIDA (1990), and as partially reproduced by Danida in its 'Evaluation Guidelines' (2006):

Cultural Intrusion	Local customs regarding dress, personal interaction, religious beliefs and practices should be respected.
Anonymity/confidentiality	Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source.
Responsibility for evaluations	In some countries, criticism can have serious consequences for a national. Evaluators must take care that those involved as local evaluators either endorse a report, or that their restricted roles are clearly described in the report. Statements should not be made on behalf of the evaluation team if other team members have not had an opportunity to disagree.
Right to privacy	Evaluators should realise that people can be extremely busy and their participation in evaluations can be burdensome. Therefore, evaluators should provide ample notice and minimise demands on time.
Supremacy of fundamental values	There is a delicate balance between certain cultural practices and the deprivation of fundamental rights and freedoms. While evaluators are expected to respect other cultures, they must also be aware of the values affecting minorities and particular groups. In such matters the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is the operative guide.
Omissions	Ethically, evaluators have a responsibility to bring to light issues and findings which may not relate directly to the Terms of Reference. Certain other issues can cause difficulties for the evaluator and should be acknowledged and discussed with the Evaluation manager as necessary.
Evaluation of individuals	Performance evaluation is not normally a part of evaluations, though reports will touch on issues such as leadership and management competence that border on evaluation of individuals. The evaluator is not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.

EHA Supervision and Support

PLEASE READ THIS CASE IN ADVANCE OF THE COURSE SESSION!

Assist, Protect or Control

(While they did not and would not all happen together, this case is based on real experiences from a variety of evaluations)[9]

In a mid-sized humanitarian organisation, a 'Geographical Desk' Officer feels that a particular programme is not well managed. An external evaluation might improve the programme and, perhaps, teach the field director a lesson or two. The evaluation unit would like to be seen to be responsive to 'operational priorities'. Evaluations are often criticised by operations staff as irrelevant, or badly managed. Funds are found which must be committed rapidly (unspent funds will be returned to the central budget). The evaluation will take place!

The evaluation unit wants 'ownership' to be shared. They hurriedly request Terms of Reference (TOR) from the Desk. Priority is given to issues of contention between headquarters and the field. The TOR are 'professionalised' in the evaluation unit, through the addition of a set of criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact…) and a list of questions. A paragraph on methodology is also inserted, essentially interviewing, observation and documentary research.

The contracting of external evaluators proves unexpectedly difficult. The assumption that a handpicked team could be put together, made up of tried and trusted consultants, is wrong. The financial department insists on a tender. A consortium of five consultants (a team-leader/generalist, and four technical experts) wins on a balance between price and quality. The team looks good on paper. That said, other proposals included *individuals* that are known by the organisation as highly competent both technically and as evaluators, yet sensitive to the culture and needs of the organisation, and fluent in the local language. The consortium cannot match this combination.

When the field is informed, sparks fly. The field director is livid. She says this is the third such exercise (carried out by a range of donors and partners) in as many months. It is decided to postpone and shorten the field visits. The nutritionist now cannot participate, as he had time just for the original planned period. The team insists that the words 'to be addressed if feasible' be inserted into the TOR on the nutrition questions. Field staff are anxious upon hearing of the evaluation. Why them? Is there a plan to cut staff? Will heads roll? They are re-assured by the evaluation unit that it is all about 'broad lessons' and not their performance. The field staff, timorous that a failure to co-operate would be seen as a lack of transparency, agrees to support fully.

A short meeting at headquarters is held with the team. Papers are hurriedly collected and copied in a file for each. The original assessment of needs is inadvertently left out and is only received in the field. A few cursory interviews are held (albeit not with key technical units, who have a number of issues they would like to see examined). The consultants pry into many issues (perhaps related, but not central to the evaluation). They demand documentation that requires a lot of effort to prepare. Headquarters staff are uneasy and some downright critical, albeit behind closed doors. Based on

[9] *This case includes some issues identified in a case by the same author, originally prepared for UNHCR*

conversations with the field director, an itinerary has been proposed. Unbeknownst to all, some of the assumptions regarding logistics (distances, frequency of flights, etc.) are erroneous. To save USD200 per ticket, the evaluation unit insisted on a flight route which implies exhausting transfers and delays. The unit also refuses to help with visas, reluctantly providing a note for the embassies concerned, but no more. The team is tired before it begins.

On arrival to the field, they find that contrary to briefings at headquarters, there are major problems with nutrition. The health expert, despite her limited expertise, takes on the nutrition issues in addition to her other responsibilities. At one stage, the team has a serious falling out. Another of the technical experts insists that the evaluation cannot be conducted unless the field offices produce hard *statistical* information on the assistance delivered, when, where and to whom. This was never systematically recorded and is simply not available. The team-leader over-rules the team-member. The expert effectively sulks through the rest of the mission. He is increasingly hard to find, turns up late to meetings, seemingly doing other work he has brought along, and is constantly emailing and phoning.

One field worker has had an on-going row with his boss. He ingratiates himself with the team by 'feeding them the dirt' on certain contentious episodes. He 'courts' the evaluation team by inviting them home to eat and socialise. One team-member in particular takes up the regular invitations. The superior detects this and decides to withdraw his support. He refuses to be interviewed and criticises the evaluation team to his staff. Word gets back to headquarters that the evaluation is already in trouble.

The evaluation manager decides to go to the field to see for himself. He is cautious, however, not to be seen as interfering with what is an 'external' evaluation. He meets with the team-leader (not the team, again seeing team matters as the responsibility of the leader). They assure each other mutually that the evaluation is on track and that the team differences can be overcome. After detailed review of finances (evaluation team meal costs, taxis, etc.), the evaluation manager returns to headquarters.

The time required for interviews has been under-estimated. Interview quality suffers, as does the health of the evaluators (stress). One field location has to be dropped from the programme. Significant preparations have been made in that location. Staff at the location are very disappointed. Additionally, this sub-programme apparently contains aspects and issues that are quite specific and quite unlike those of other areas. On another occasion, the team arrives to the wrong place for an interview. The driver, who was meant to be fluent in English, in fact had only a rudimentary knowledge of the language. He misunderstood the instructions given in English by the team.

'Assembling' the draft report becomes a nightmare for the team-leader. Differing styles must be married into one coherent document, in a very short time. (Two of the team are not native English speakers). Some of the findings by the technicians, she discovers, are based on incorrect information. Others fall outside the Terms of Reference. To 'fix' the eventual draft report, a lot of extra work is needed, by both the team and headquarters. This is despite recommendations that are both substantiated and of great potential importance for beneficiary welfare. Many of the weaknesses of the report are merely editing matters. None-the-less, the field vehemently rejects the first draft, which is deeply critical of their performance. They reject the entire exercise as amateurish, citing shoddy drafting, and the inadequate coverage of nutrition and certain geographic areas. To cap it all, one team-member wishes to check recommendations. Unilaterally, he decides to discuss these with interviewees (both inside and outside the organisation). The organisation is deeply embarrassed! Under internal pressure, the evaluation unit refuses to pay the consortium the last instalment of fees. A mumbled threat to sue is made.

Finally, the evaluation unit had tried to be professional by building follow-up of the evaluation into the TOR (workshops on the conclusions, and lessons, etc.). This is now not feasible due to the loss of confidence in the process. None-the-less, the Desk has taken some recommendations selectively to justify staff cuts! *John Telford, for ALNAP, 2002*

Task

Please read the above case and answer these questions:

- How might problems have been addressed or avoided by the evaluation manager(s)?
- Make your suggestions as practical as possible – what concrete actions might s/he have taken?
- Where relevant, please consider actions before, during and after the evaluation.

You have 20 minutes

EHA Management Checklist

Preparatory Action by Evaluation Team

- Commenting on the TOR.
- Preparing others – who else needs to prepare for the evaluation.
- Making sure that the basic data will be available and sufficient copies.
- Making sure that important data, trends, insights are well documented, organised, presented.
- Preparing visits – check what dates and times are possible. When selecting people or organisations to be visited, evaluators need to make sure that they consider more than their own priorities.
- Organisational logistical issues – analysing chronologically what will be needed.
- Preparing the team itself – ensure that each member knows the objectives for the evaluation, preparatory meetings.

Document Review

The evaluators will be expected to carry out a detailed review of project/policy documentation. This is likely to involve a review of:

- Original and subsequent project emails and memoranda
- Any previous reviews or evaluations of the projects/themes
- Original and revised programme proposals or log frames
- Relevant policy and strategy documents
- General literature related to the sector/issue/theme
- Relevant evaluations and reviews by other donors
- Policies and strategies of the partner government/institutions

Fieldwork

- **Time:** length, share of total evaluation time
- **Timeliness**: relative to emergency assistance, relative to other variables affecting effectiveness
- **Field contacts**: beneficiaries, field actors, donor representatives, agency headquarters
- **Structure of fieldwork**: single stage, multi stage
- **Division of responsibilities**: sectoral, country/area
- **Limits**: access, security, beneficiary recall, attrition of staff, availability of records

Planning country visits and fieldwork

- These need to be planned well in advance. The organisations commissioning the evaluations usually make first contact with field offices, partner governments and arrange the necessary permissions.

Staff security

- The personal security of evaluation staff must be a primary concern. Travel routes should be planned, mapped, and filed with supervisors and/or security officers before evaluators leave for emergency locations. All necessary permits should be obtained before entering potentially hostile or sensitive secured areas.

Preparations by evaluation manager

- The Evaluation Manager at the start of the evaluation will brief the evaluators. This briefing should include discussion of:

  - TOR

  - Initial work plan

  - Advisory group

  - Roles and responsibilities (incl. Evaluation Manager)

  - Support provided

  - Document and files required

  - Confidentiality and security clearance

  - Best practice examples of evaluation reports

- It is important to establish the regular reporting mechanisms that will be followed by the different parties during the work.

- Constraints to the evaluation, which the team is about to undertake – security, political, weather factors – need to be considered.

Gaining cooperation and foreseeing follow up

- The extent to which controversy is anticipated can be a good indicator of the need to make every effort to include those concerned in the planning. Apprehension can be reduced when evaluation and operation personnel discuss goals and build a consensus. In general, the planning process is more important in producing change than strict follow-up procedures.

Useful questions for the evaluator to know:

- What actions did the evaluation manager undertake prior to your arrival on the scene?

- What decisions were made as to the timing and content of the evaluation?

- What political realities and contextual issues affected the process?

- Was cooperation gained from all stakeholders?

- Are stakeholders aware of how the evaluation will benefit them? Was the exercise painted as a contribution to dialogue and not a judgement?

- Were the stakeholders involved in planning – discussing goals, building consensus, planning the evaluation approach – and to what degree?
- Was the TOR submitted to stakeholders for their approval to help in gaining commitment to the evaluation?
- Were the constraints (security, lack of data, etc.) to the evaluation made clear to the stakeholders?

Evaluation Stages and Responsibilities

STAGE	TASKS	RESPONSIBILITY	OUTPUTS
Planning and commissioning	Drafting, circulation and approval of concept note Selection and briefing of Steering Group Drafting, circulation and approval of TOR Consultant selection	Evaluation Manager Evaluation Manager (+ Steering Group)	Concept paper TOR Tender documents
Inception	Briefing consultants Initial research Drafting Inception report Circulation and approval of Inception Report	Evaluation Manager Consultants Consultants Evaluation Manager and Steering Group	Inception report
Preparation and research	Project/programme research Interviews (UK and email) Planning country visits and dissemination strategy	Consultants Consultants Consultants, Evaluation Manager and Steering Group	
Country visits	Preparatory visit: Planning activities Draft and circulate visit report Main visit: Evaluation research Workshop(s) Draft and circulate visit report	Consultants (implementation) Evaluation Manager (Quality of process)	Visit reports In-country workshops
Reporting	Draft report and EVALUATION SUMMARY	Consultants	Draft Report

STAGE	TASKS	RESPONSIBILITY	OUTPUTS
	Circulate report for comment Edit and revise report Circulation and comment on revised report Submission to Development Committee Final amendments to report	 Evaluation Manager and Steering Group Consultants & editor Evaluation Manager and Steering Group Evaluation Manager Evaluation Manager and Consultants	 Revised Report Final Report
Dissemination	Publication and distribution of report and EVALUATION SUMMARY Workshops	Evaluation Manager Consultants, Steering Group and Evaluation Manager	Published Report EVALUATION SUMMARY Workshop

Source: Evaluation guidelines DFID, Evaluation Department

Teamwork and Leadership

The following approach to leadership was developed by John Adair in conjunction with the Industrial Society. In John Adair's view, there is no standard format for successful leadership and teamwork. It is therefore important to look at the actions that a leader and team members have to take in order to be effective. These actions relate to achieving a balance between the following three elements of teamwork:

1. **THE TASK**
2. **THE TEAM**
3. **THE INDIVIDUAL**

The three elements are interrelated, and neglecting one element can lead to the degeneration of all three. Below are some considerations which may be necessary for effective teamwork to complete a task: -

THE TASK	THE TEAM	THE INDIVIDUAL
❖ Set clear objectives for the task ❖ Assess the needs of individuals, the team and the task ❖ Plan for completion of the task ❖ Do the task ❖ Set up systems for monitoring and evaluating the task ❖ Modify operational systems where necessary ❖ Complete the task	❖ Establish and agree a clear goal with the team ❖ Establish commitment to the task and system ❖ Set targets and standards ❖ Allocate roles, including any leadership roles ❖ Co-ordinate and co-operate with individuals and the team ❖ Set up clear communication and consultation systems ❖ Decide what the decision making process will be ❖ Ensure the whole team can participate	❖ Motivate ❖ Encourage contributions ❖ Give responsibility ❖ Facilitate ownership ❖ Recognise individual's skills

Evaluator Competencies and Qualities

The following are qualities that may be considered in choosing evaluators. They are neither necessary nor sufficient qualities, but merely indicative. Actual choices should be according to actual contexts:

- Inquiring - openness to new ideas.
- Inter-personal and analytical skills - particularly in complex emergencies, the need to interact with such diverse groups as local authorities, implementing partner agency staff, the affected population, and—increasingly—the military or members of armed factions demands an extraordinary level of diplomacy and tact.
- Demonstrable interviewing skills, the willingness and ability to listen, the ability to foster discussion among participating beneficiary groups, social organisation. Keen observation skills and a deep sense of curiosity are also needed.
- Thorough.
- Detached.
- Ability to think systematically and rigorously.
- Strong writing, numeracy, and accounting skills.
- Familiarity with the day-to-day operations of the programme. Ideally, evaluators should be able to work from programme documents and interviews and determine whether or not planned objectives were achieved.
- Familiarity with the political context.
- Sensitivity to the complexity and constraints associated with the organisation’s mandate.
- Credibility with the managers who will implement the evaluation recommendations.

Managing Multi-agency Evaluations (MAEs)

The following is a short note on managing Multi-Agency Evaluations (MAEs)[10]. It sets out some indicative considerations and is not comprehensive. It is not an evaluation guide, rather a complement to such guides focussing on the specificity of MAEs. The note is based on the assumption that the two overall differences between MAEs and other evaluations boil down to, **firstly**, the number of actors involved (especially in the management of the evaluation) and **secondly**, the potential breadth of the activities, content or programme to be evaluated (e.g. a multi-actor programme rather than a single agency programme, project or activity level).

The note takes a chronological approach, through the main evaluation management steps or phases (allowing, however, that phases may overlap and run parallel). It is based on the assumption that the evaluation is a classical evaluation exercise, involving a team of consultants (or mixed with agency staff), going to 'the field', returning and reporting. If the exercise involves a number of constituent evaluations or studies, each one might be managed in the following manner, within a larger, overall structure and process. Considerations and key questions are set out as bullet-points under each step:

❖ **Assessment and scoping of the value of conducting conduct an MAE**

- What is the added-value of a joint exercise as opposed to individual exercises, especially in function of its ultimate usage/user-focus? If so, what might those uses be, aimed at what target groups/audiences?

- Is there sufficient buy-in for an MAE, including understanding of the complexities, costs and benefits of an MAE?

- Can the multiple possible stakeholders to be mapped, prioritised and consulted and by whom and by when will they be consulted?

❖ **Establishing a multi-agency management structure**

- Can the main actors be identified and committed to the process, e.g. through the unambiguous provision of time and resources?

- Can a lead or host agency be identified? This is to provide a legally established umbrella organisation e.g. that the MAE be under the aegis of one of the constituent organisations, as a host, providing a physical 'home'; administrative and contracting body (e.g. for the team); accounts and legal status; etc.

- Based on the identification of those actors, what is the most effective and efficient management structure? This will probably be multi-layered, including: an overall MAE group, including an appropriate chairperson; a smaller management sub-committee (e.g. 3 – 5 people, ideally including the overall chairperson); a day-to-day manager (who would also sit on the management sub-committee, but without voting rights); an administrative and coordination secretariat (based in the host agency, to support the manager and entire under-taking); and the evaluation team.

- An explicit agreement on roles, responsibilities, rights and obligations of all concerned. This includes fundamentally who holds the 'ownership' of the process and its products (e.g. the report).

[10] This short note reflects comments made by the author, John Telford, in response to a number of requests and initiatives; a roundtable meeting on the subject of joint evaluations, sponsored by ALNAP, DEC, ECB2 and the TEC in 2006; a review of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) exercise, also held in 2006; and a draft guide being produced by the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) project.

Ownership entails a series of aspects, from legal rights and obligations, to decision-making authority, especially in the event of disputes.

- Agreement and formalization of procedures for relevant aspects of the process, including establishment of the management structure; dismantling of the structure (including consideration of future ownership of the products of the MAE); a disputes-management mechanism; and financial, material and human resource management (including contracting the evaluation team and other resource provision, especially for day-to-day secretariat functions).

❖ **Designing the MAE and TOR**

- Managing and focusing multiple possible uses, needs and expectations (links to assessment and scoping of need above). This includes prioritization of the possible target users and audiences for the possible products coming from the evaluation.

- Delegating authority to the management sub-committee to make these decisions with the confidence and support of the broader MAE group, subject their review and approval.

❖ **Team selection, preparation and planning**

- Decision by the MAE group and/or sub-committee on the nature and size of the team.

- Delegation of selection to the management sub-committee, based on accepted standards of professionalism, independence and transparency.

- Close coordination, preparation and planning among the management sub-committee, contracting (host) entity, MAE manager and the evaluation team. In function of the scoping and TOR, this includes the transparent selection of locations to be visited, possible stakeholders to be involved,

❖ **Conducting the MAE, including analysis and reporting**

- Application of methods and availability of time and resources in accordance with the possible breadth of aspects, issues and locations to be covered.

- Allowing sufficient time and ‘space’ (e.g. workshops) for the above and for team and stakeholder analysis of what may be very considerable materials and findings emerging (possibly more than in a single-agency undertaking).

- Clear agreements on when, how and by whom the draft reports will be reviewed. Of particular importance is explicit agreement on the authority of reviewers, especially if they are from within the overall management group i.e. are certain types of comments to always to be acted upon (such as errors of fact or inadequate verification) while others are of an advisory nature only (e.g. interpretations or analysis).

❖ **Dissemination and use**

- Agreement (well in advance, preferably at the outset) on the number and type of products that will result from the MAE (according to the diverse sets of target groups/audiences).

- A usage, dissemination and communications plan for the outputs of the exercise. This would explain whether the process is centralized (managed by the sub-committee and/or the secretariat, or some such group), de-centralised (among all the agencies involved and possibly others), or a mixture of both. Given the complex range of possible stakeholders and locations involved, planning may need to be delegated to a sub-committee.

- Resources available for the implementation of the plan, and for unforeseen costs.

- A follow-up plan, including whatever activities are seen to be relevant, as decided by the overall MAE group. This would be in function of the initial scoping, TOR and results of the MAE. It could imply a new structure and process involving the agencies wishing to take the results forward into a new review and action process.

- A review of the MAE itself, recording lessons on the exercise. This would probably require a workshop or one-day meeting of all main actors and stakeholders.

Handout: West Africa – SGVB 'Sex-for-Food' abuse

This case may be accompanied by a video, if available, which was filmed in Guinea. It covers related events and testimonies.

The following is an extract from the February 2002:

Note for Implementing and Operational Partners by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK on Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone based on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001

INTRODUCTION

This assessment was initiated by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK (SC-UK) due to growing concerns, based on their field experience, about the nature and extent of sexual violence and exploitation of refugee children and other children of concern to UNHCR in the countries of the Mano River Sub Region in West Africa.

(…)

KEY FINDINGS

A) Sexual Exploitation

a) The problem of sexual exploitation

Sexual exploitation was defined by children as: 'when them big man go loving with small girl for money. Them big men can go loving to small girls, they can call girl when she walking along the road, and then the girl go and they go in house and lock the door. And when the big man has done his business he will give the small girl money or gift'

The exchange of sex for money or gifts appears to be widespread and the majority of children consulted said they knew of at least one other child involved in such an exchange. The children themselves, whilst aware of the exploitative nature of the exchange, felt this was often the only option they had in order to receive food and other basic necessities and to pay for education. Parents were often aware of the exploitation but also felt that there were no other options for their family to secure a livelihood and whilst not approving it, generally turned a blind eye. In some cases, however, it was reported that parents encouraged their daughters to engage in such activities to bring an income into the family. The majority of children involved are girls between the ages of 13 and 18 years. Younger girls were sometimes befriended by men to gain access to their older sisters or to their mothers. A few boys were reportedly exploited in a similar way by older women, but there were no suggestions of boys being sexually exploited by men. This may have to do with the greater taboos surrounding homosexuality.

The children most vulnerable to sexual exploitation were those without the care of their parents, children in child headed households, orphaned children, children in foster care, children living with extended family members and children living with just one parent. One observation was the attitude held by many men interviewed i.e. that younger girls are more desirable as sexual partners. This view seemed to be commonly held by many of the men interviewed, including agency workers and community leaders. Some also believed that sex with a virgin could cleanse a man from infection.

The assessment suggests that those who exploit children are often men in positions of relative power and influence who either control access to goods and services or who have wealth and/or income. This power and influence is then used in exchange for sexual favours from children. The report indicates that it is a relatively prosperous 'elite' – including UN staff, peacekeepers and NGO workers – whose

resources are considerably more than those of the refugees who exploit this extreme disparity surrounding the refugee population. Exploiters appear to be able to pay for sex when and with whom they want, and to do so with impunity, since the very people they exploit are not able to complain about their situation for fear of their source of basic survival being removed.

b) Exploitation by humanitarian agency staff

In all three countries, agency workers from international and local NGOs as well as UN agencies were reportedly the most frequent sex exploiters of children, often using the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee population as a tool of exploitation. Most of the allegations involved male national staff, trading humanitarian commodities and services, including oil, bulgur wheat, tarpaulin or plastic sheeting, medicines, transport, ration cards, loans, education courses, skills training and other basic services, in exchange for sex with girls under 18. The practice appeared particularly pronounced in locations with large established aid programmes. From the assessment report there appears to be a pattern of this type of abuse in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia in particular: “It’s difficult to escape the trap of those (NGO) people; they use the food as bait to get you to sex with them”. (adolescent in Liberia).

Agency workers use their positions to withhold services that are meant to benefit children. Such services are held back and excuses made until sex is proffered: “Your name is not on the list”, “The computer swallowed your card”, or “Your name did not come from head office”. Some allegations by children were confirmed by adults: “In this community no one can access CSB (a soya nutrient), without having sex first. They say “a kilo for sex” (refugee women in Guinea); “If you do not have a wife or a sister or a daughter to offer the NGO workers, it is hard to have access to aid” (returnee male in Sierra Leone); “If you see a young girl walking away with tarpaulin on her head you know how she got it” (refugee leaders in Guinea).

Agency workers with special responsibilities for children, such as caring for children with disabilities, providing accelerated learning programmes, and loans for the vulnerable, were allegedly using the very same resources intended to improve children’s lives and reduce their vulnerability, as a tool of exploitation. Frequent reports were received by the assessment team on how agency workers give these services to girls in exchange for sex.

Some agency drivers were reportedly using transportation as a means of sexually exploiting children, either by exchanging sex for lifts or by bringing items to the camps which the refugees would not otherwise receive. Some agency workers reported seeing male drivers have sexual relationships with different girls for short periods of time. “They change girls so much and none of them marry the girls and if she becomes pregnant she is abandoned, with no support for herself and the child. Most of us used to just look at them and wonder. Our brothers, they have a problem.” (agency worker in Liberia)

Agency workers allegedly ask girls for sex in exchange for employment and continued to demand sexual favours even after the girls were employed. The girls said they were reminded that the salary they earn was payment for sexual favours. “No girl will get a job in this camp without having sex with NGO workers. NGO workers who are female already loving with an NGO man. He will continue to go loving with other girls, but girls see it as competition. It is survival of the fittest”, (agency worker in Guinea).

Agency workers are seen to have status, good jobs, money, drive nice cars. From a position of power girls are seen as easily exploitable. “For a man when he has a powerful position, status, drives a nice car and earns good money, what do you expect? He can want a girl and yes she can get pregnant”. (Child Protection Committee chairperson). Even though agency workers may pay more than other exploiters, this might still amount to very little in most cases. A Liberian refugee girl, for example, may get the equivalent of US 10 cents in exchange for sex with which she would be able to buy a couple of pieces of fruit or a handful of peanuts. More often than not payment may be in kind such as a few biscuits, a plastic sheet, a bar of soap.

Refugees felt unable to challenge the behaviour of agency staff firstly because of their dependence upon the goods and services for their survival and secondly because of the power held by these staff. “If the NGO worker runs away, there will be no food for us”. (adolescent in Liberia). “NGO workers have so much power that people treat them as really important people and the community cannot challenge them.” (refugee leaders in Guinea)

The lack of senior and international staff presence in the camps was reportedly allowing junior agency staff to behave with impunity. The assessment describes a 'conspiracy of silence' that exists amongst agency workers and suggests that staff will not pass on information about a colleague involved in sexual exploitation for risk of being stigmatised and ostracised. It was further suggested that the pressure to conform within the humanitarian community, led staff to also indulge in exploitative behaviour. There are inadequate mechanisms for reporting abuses available to refugees and little prospect of doing so in a way that is safe and confidential: “If you report one NGO worker you will not only be in trouble with that person, but with the other staff also”. (adolescents in Guinea and Liberia)

Refugees complained that they have tried to send written complaints through other staff but that the information has been held back. Children complained that they are harassed or labelled or denied services when they tried to complain. Refugees spoke of trying to see senior staff but being stopped by security guards outside their offices. They also said that it is easy for their complaints to be discredited as they hear humanitarian workers tell their seniors: “Refugees are traumatised and they have a lot of issues that they need to deal with. That is why they are always complaining”.

In most of the camps, the refugee and IDP leaders are they (sic) not reporting or dealing with issues of sexual exploitation. Some children said: “because they themselves are involved and because how can they report the very people that put them in power. They want to maintain their power and one way of doing it is by siding with the NGO workers.”

c) Exploitation by security forces

Some national military personnel that provide security within and around the camps reportedly sexually exploit girls, usually for little or no payment as the girls fear the consequences of refusing to have sex with these men. With respect to peacekeeping personnel, the assessment team was informed that they are, on arrival in the location, briefed on the Code of Personal Conduct: “Every soldier, officer has been read and shown the code of conduct; no one can plead ignorance”. (UNAMSIL officer) However, the code of conduct and the reality on the ground appeared to be different matters. The assessment team reported many allegations of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers from several countries. A few examples of reported cases are given here.

Peacekeepers are alleged to have sexually exploited children in exchange for money and food. It is claimed that even some very young children have been asked to pose naked in exchange for biscuits, cake powder and other food items. “When ma asked me to go to the stream to wash plates, a peacekeeper asked me to take my clothes off so that he can take a picture. When I asked him to give me money he told me, no money for children only biscuit.” Children and adults spoke of teenage girls being asked to strip naked, bath and pose in certain positions while the peacekeepers took pictures, watched and laughed. Some are alleged to have had sex with the girls without using condoms.

Peacekeepers are reportedly among the highest paying customers for sex with children. They pay from US $5 to $300. Some peacekeepers are alleged to pool money to obtain a girl and then all have sex with the same child. Certain battalions used a locally well-known phrase “jig jig 5 block” to procure sex from girls in their early teens.

Some peacekeepers reportedly go as far as meeting the parents of a girl and claiming they have good intentions. However, when the time comes to leave, “Some of them leave without even saying goodbye, and some will leave the parents some money to take care of the girl. Others will give the girl some of their personal belongings.” Asked how much and what personal belongings, the girls laugh and say, “If he really liked you he would leave you his cooking things, bedding and a picture. If he

loved you he might leave you his underwear to remember him by (more laughter)". (adolescent and women IDPs in Sierra Leone) In one community, peacekeepers were reported to have rented a room in town and used it for sex with teenagers. When this practice reached unacceptable levels, the community repeatedly tried to do something. All the girls who were caught were paraded and mocked by the community as punishment. Such measures did not act as a deterrent given the money to be made. The girls then reportedly sent middle "men" instead - young boys, including brothers, relatives or friends - to find peacekeeper clients for them.

Teenage girls complained to the assessment team of the difficulty of making a living through hard work. Girls who are trying to earn a living through selling items at the market are made fun of by other girls. "Why are you suffering here wasting your time? Look at me and all the nice things I can now buy. If you want to live good go to UNAMSIL". (adolescent girl in IDP camp in Sierra Leone)

Girls allegedly come from far and wide to make money in this way, from as far afield as Guinea, with Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugee girls making their way to Sierra Leone irrespective of security considerations. The position of power, wealth and status enjoyed by peacekeeping personnel gives them the ability to do as they wish. In Freetown, nationals spoke about the behaviour of the 'boys in blue helmets' with a feeling of helplessness and sadness. "All you need to do is go to Paddys (a bar in Freetown) around four o'clock and in the evening you will see for yourself, or just drive along the beach. All the restaurants there, you just see these big men with little girls. You go to Lumley Beach and Laka Beach and no one needs to tell you anything." (comments from a police officer, government representatives and agency staff in Freetown)

d) Exploitation by others

In addition to the reported exploitation by agency staff and security forces, the assessment also identified a range of other categories of individuals that use positions of trust, authority and power to sexually exploit children.

· Teachers are said to extract sexual favours from children in return for good grades

· Refugee leaders that have gained status due to close association with UNHCR, NGOs and other implementing and operational partners, are also then in a position to control access to resources and to exploit children on the basis of this.

· Commercial sector people such as diamond miners, logging company employees and local businessmen are also in positions of relative prosperity and so able to negotiate sex with girls in exchange for small sums of money or gifts.

e) Factors contributing to sexual exploitation of refugee children

i) Poverty, lack of livelihood options and consequent inability to meet basic survival needs

The underlying issue of poverty and lack of livelihood options for all the refugees and IDPs interviewed as part of the assessment was considered to be the principal factor contributing to the exploitation of children. The involvement of children and women in sexually exploitative relationships has become a mechanism for survival for many refugee families. The assessment makes it very clear that sexual exploitation cannot be addressed without providing alternative means and opportunities for earning an income. The dependence on exploitative relationships for basic survival is illustrated as follows: "If I tell you the name of the NGO worker I have to sex with, he will get fired, and then how will I feed my child and myself?" (girl mother in Guinea); "Yesterday I was walking with a friend of mine and this kind NGO worker stopped his car and gave me 100 Liberian dollars (US$ 20). I was able to help my child and myself. If I tell you his name and he looses his job, what will I do?" (girl mother in Liberia).

The absence of livelihood options has left parents feeling helpless. Parents feel their position has been compromised because they are unable to provide for their families even to minimum standards.

Policies of host governments sometimes hinder refugees from being hired as salaried employees. The humanitarian community, therefore hire refugees giving them only incentives. The other reason that was consistently given to the assessment team was that “If refugees are given jobs, they will not want to go back home.” (UNHCR staff) Asked about this, the refugees said, “Home is home. Who would want to stay as a refugee in someone’s country, just because of a job, and anyway such low paying jobs that become available within the camps?” (Refugee in Guinea). Refugees told the assessment team that the only way to access money in the refugee community is to sell the food ration and to let their daughters enter into sexually exploitative relationships.

ii) Insufficient food rations/supplies

In every meeting, insufficient ration was raised as a primary factor contributing to sexual exploitation. Food given to the refugee community for thirty days was said to finish within ten days and refugees did not have land to grow their own food to supplement. When the food finished and the family needed more, the immediate option was to get money quickly and buy food. The girls would become a means to access money quickly and easily. “I am a mother of seven children and when the food finishes my youngest child keeps crying and pulling on my skirt, what do you think you can do if your daughter brings you some?” (refugee woman in Liberia)

Despite the constant complaints about the inadequacy of the food rations, refugees said that little effort has been made to acknowledge this as an issue and to try to work out solutions that involve the refugees themselves.

iii) Issues in relation to the management and delivery of humanitarian aid

It appears that the overall pattern of humanitarian assistance has led to overwhelming dependency of refugees and also increases the risk to children. From interviews and discussions during the mission, the team found that:

· The size of the plastic sheet determines the size of the house but for larger families in particular it is inadequate and affords no privacy. Children are being exposed to sexual activity of adults from an early age;

· The food ration is for thirty days but it is calculated on kilocalories and not quantity and so finishes within ten days. There is not enough land to grow additional food;

· Non-food items given are not replaced and there are not enough income-generating jobs for the refugees to earn money to buy their own;

· Education is free but all the other related expenses are left for the parents to provide, like books, pencil, uniforms and shoes. This often prevents children attending school.

· Information on basic rights and entitlements to food, shelter and services is not known, especially to children, which allows corrupt and exploitative patterns of behaviour to flourish in presenting access to basic entitlements as a 'privilege'

iv) Pressure from peers and parents

In the absence of other ways of meeting their basic needs themselves and those of their families, of making money to purchase clothes and socialise with friends, adolescents often feel compelled to sell themselves. Girls may be mocked if they do not have 'fashionable clothes' and there is also evidence of parental collusion and even encouragement for girls to enter into exploitative relationships in order to bring in money.

When a girl takes home some money questions are not asked as to how she has earned it. When asked, children said that they tell their parents different stories like “I picked the money up on my way from school, a kind uncle/man gave it to me, my friend gave me, my auntie gave it to me.” In most

situations the children said there was no need to explain how they earned the money because parents were only too glad that the money was there. In other situations the parents allegedly sent the child. “You know we need 1500 today and we do not have it. Go and find it and do not come back until you have the money”, or “You are now big enough and you should start contributing to the food in this house”. (adolescent boys and girls in Guinea)

The pressure to conform to traditional harmful practices such as female genital mutilation also led girls into exchanging sex for 'sponsorship'. In such cases, men would allegedly provide the necessary payments associated with these procedures and receive sexual favours in return. Girls are also forced into early marriages in order to relieve families of the financial burden of supporting them. “I was 14 years old and my grandfather forced me to marry an old man. I was so sad, became pregnant and had a child. Again I became pregnant and I had another child. I waited for him and prayed until he died, now I am free and I have never looked at another man again.” (adolescent girl in Liberia)

f) Consequences of sexual exploitation for refugee children

i) Teenage pregnancies

Most girls find that their families and care-givers reject them when they become pregnant. One option becomes terminating the pregnancy. However abortion is illegal in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and is reportedly a felony offence punishable with life imprisonment. The medical services that are supported by UNHCR and located in the refugee camps, do not carry out an abortion as the staff must abide by the law. Children therefore resort to different traditional and other informal methods.

Children and women spoke of the different methods that are used, a combination of traditional herbs and easily accessed pharmaceutical products. Children said that even if they went to the medical clinic they would not tell the staff they had induced the abortion. Children from IDP camps spoke of the medical staff chasing away girls who go to the clinics to try and seek medical attention. “They will refuse to treat you no matter how sick you are, and they will chase you out of the clinic threatening to report you to the police for having committed an offence. They will tell you that you killed a person.” Children also said they would only go to the clinic if their lives were in danger and even if they went they would not tell the medical staff about what they had done for fear of being threatened and called names.

ii) Girl mothers

The assessment had a lot of difficulty in obtaining data relating to the number of teenage girls who have been pregnant, are pregnant, married or have had a child. However, the presence of girl mothers as a result of teenage pregnancy was very apparent in most camps. The assessment team could see that this was one group of children that had few or no programmes targeted towards them. “If we had alternative ways of making money, I would never look at another man again for a long, long time.” (girl mother in Guinea)

In most meetings, the girl mothers displayed visible signs of broken spirits. They were the only group that at times were not even able to give the assessment team recommendations. They were resigned to their situations to a degree that they saw no way through. Most of them had become mothers between the ages of 13 and 16. Even though these girls were now 19, they already had three to four children and had first become pregnant when they were 13 or 14 years. Information from the community gave very alarming figures of the rates of girl pregnancy e.g. six deliveries every week by girls 18 years and below; 50% pregnancy rates of all the teenage girls in the camp; 75% pregnancy of all the girls in school. The assessment team was, however, not able to confirm these figures, as there are no available records from any NGO.

Girls who were allegedly made pregnant by fellow students, fellow refugees, and agency workers, had one thing in common. Regardless of who the father was, they took no responsibility for the child and the mother. “They want you when you are young and single but once you get pregnant and with a child they reject you.” (girl mother in Sierra Leone); “An NGO worker made me pregnant but now he

left me and is loving to another young girl." (girl mother in Guinea). Some NGO workers were allegedly using code names in some places to avoid responsibility for the child. The children said that if a person uses a code name and they make you pregnant, they would then deny responsibility and start using their real name.

iii) Reduced educational opportunities

There were high illiteracy levels among girl mothers. Some of them did not even know their age. In groups of 25, there would be one or two who would still be going to school or skills training. Girl mothers who tried to start or continue their schooling spoke of the difficulties they had to find help. Most of them had to go to school with the child and they said these created difficult and embarrassing situations. "When I go to school with the child I feel bad because I am not free and if the child messes up I have to leave class and clean him up. The other students will be complaining that the class smells and I feel really bad." (girl mother in Guinea); "When I am in class I will not concentrate. I worry about what I, my little sister and my child will eat when I get home." (girl mother in Sierra Leone)

Throughout the assessment period, there was no mention of programmes that support girl mothers with childcare while they are in school. The family support network that would normally take on this role as been further weakened, exposing the girls to more abuse. The means for the girl mothers to make money in order to feed and support the child and themselves emerged as another contributing factor for girl mothers dropping out of school. A few quotations demonstrate the difficulties most of these girl mothers have to endure: "I have to sleep with so many men to make 1500, so that I can feed myself and my child. They pay me 300 each time, but if I am lucky and I get an NGO worker he can pay me 1500 at one time and sometimes I get 2000" (girl mother in Guinea); "I leave my child with my little sister, who is ten years old, and I dress good and I go where the NGO workers drink or live and one of them will ask me for sex, sometimes they give me things like food, oil, soap and I will sell them and get money." "I sleep with different men but mostly NGO workers because I have to eat and feed my child" (girl mother in Liberia); "The wife of the business man saw me with her husband who promised to pay me and she came and beat me, I could not fight her because she was big, the man refused to pay me because I shamed him" (girl mother in Sierra Leone)

Girl mothers spoke of the difficulties they face in being accepted in society: "The adult women treat us as children and make us feel we do not belong to their group. The young and single girls of our age who have no children make us feel we dirty because we did something bad and they feel if they are with us the men will not like them, so they do not like us anymore. We are lonely most of the time." (girl mother in Guinea). With the reported high prevalence of sexual exploitation by teachers exchanging grades for sex, the education system is contributing to producing illiterate girls who will be the future illiterate mothers and women.

iv) Sexually transmitted disease (STDs) and HIV/AIDS

The assessment team did not have the mandate and the capacity to assess the numbers of refugee children who have become HIV positive as a result of sexual exploitation and violence. However, all the indicators point to high-risk behaviour patterns, which expose children to STD and HIV/AIDS infection. The combination of immature bodies, poverty, lack of negotiating powers and practices of unsafe sex, disbelief about HIV/AIDS are factors that increase the risk.

v) Pattern of sexual relationships

The assessment found a more equal power balance in peer relationships between boys and girls and thus a better possibility of negotiating safe sex through the use of condoms. However, between female adolescents and male adults there is limited or no room at all for negotiating safe sex. The amount of money the adult pays undermines the negotiating power of the girl. The strong link between sex and money has made it difficult for boys to find girlfriends since their financial status is very poor. In some camps children said that some young boys are resorting to rape since they are not able to pay the amounts demanded by the girls.

B) Sexual Violence

The assessment also focused on the problem of sexual violence. This was defined by children as: "when one person wants to do woman business and the other one does not want, and he sex her by force." Most of the children who took part in the assessment knew of or had heard of a child who had been sexually violated (generally understood as forced penetrative sex). Some of the children spoke of their friends who had experienced sexual violence. "My friend she went to church for lessons, the pastor called her to come in front, he started to do man business with her, and when she cried, he took a cloth and put it in her mouth. When she went home she told her parents, but her father said nothing should be done to the pastor. He is still at church and my friend feels very bad." (girl in Sierra Leone)

a) Those affected by sexual violence, abuse and harassment

The findings of the team indicate the following:

· Girls between the ages of four and 12 were also reported as being sexually harassed, either verbally or through touching of buttocks, breasts, or genitals. Children said boys of their age group also did the same, but that adult males were mostly responsible. "Each time ma sends me to the market them big men like touching my waist line and my boobs";

- Children reportedly experience attempted rape mostly when they go to use the toilets or take a bath. The toilets and bathrooms are all located in the same place, and divided along gender lines. Children say adult males lay watch for when the child is going to the toilet. They then follow the child and try to rape them. "Me and my friend went to the toilet and when I got in this man came and tried to sex me. I screamed and he got scared I run away with my friend." (girl in Liberia);

· It was reported that very young children are also affected;

· Most of those experiencing sexual violence suffer rape by penis penetration of vagina or by finger penetration. It seems there have been rare cases of oral rape, mainly by male parents with infants;

· Incidents of rape among children by their grandparents were also reported. Most of the children are left in the care of their grandparents by their parents. It is during the period of the parent's absence that male grandparents sexually violate the child;

· Girls living in female-headed households (no husband) are more vulnerable to sexual violence by neighbours, care givers and male friends of the mother;

· The level of sexual violence experienced by abducted girls and in IDP situations is much higher than those in refugee camps, especially where awareness campaign have been conducted as part of the sexual and gender-based violence programme;

· Children who attend dance/bola nights and who go to video shows without by adult siblings are also particularly vulnerable.

· Children who are sent to sell food and non-food items are vulnerable to sexual violence as the adult person waits for them in isolated or abandoned buildings on their way to and from selling things. Some of the children are sent to sell food items near drinking places and are expected to stay late at night until the items are sold. Some children are sent to sell food items at parking areas for long distance truck drivers.

b) In addition to those persons described above, additional alleged perpetrators include:

· Adult men including security personnel;

· Adolescent boys and young men against their peers;

· Men with drug and/or drink addictions;

· People known to the children, including neighbours and relatives;

· Unmarried men who cannot afford to pay for sex;

· Mentally ill people;

· Ex-combatants;

· Medical staff

c) Where sexual violence takes place

· Sexual violence is committed in areas around the camps such as streams where children are sent to wash their clothes and kitchen utensils, where children take baths, the bush when children are sent to look for food and firewood;

· In the surrounding villages or host community as children go looking for work in the palm wine plantations and rice fields;

· Dark and isolated places, be it buildings or bush areas within the camp, or between two parts of the same camp;

· In transit centres or emergency booths where hundreds of people are sleeping under one roof. The emergency booths are supposed to house families for a short time but in some situations families live there for more than six months. Children, especially girls, find themselves sleeping next to adult men who are not their relatives;

· In toilets and latrines, particularly where male and female latrines are in close proximity.

· At night during the bola/dance nights, and video shows. Children who attend dance and video clubs late into the night will at times try to walk home alone. The dance and video places, even when there are a lot of people around, are ideal places for perpetrators to pick out girls who seem alone and without money to pay to get in;

· During conflict situations and large scale population movements (both during flight and repatriation), at checkpoints along the route or close to IDP areas, or at military/ security locations within refugee camps;

· In the perpetrators' and or survivors' own homes.

There are reports that some boys also experience sexual violence, although the response to this notion was always met with disbelief and arguments that such things do not happen in their communities. “Within our community it is a taboo to have sex with a boy or another man.” However, most of the time the focus groups failed to differentiate sexual violence against boys from homosexuality, which is highly frowned upon and condemned by men, women and children. The lack of available reports or data on sexual violence towards boys cannot be taken as a sign of the non-existence of such acts, but rather as a silencing factor hindering boy children from coming forward and seeking assistance. “The stigma towards boys who get raped is so strong in the community, that the boy will just keep quite, and if he told his family, the fear of shame for the whole family will make them encourage the child to keep silent.” (adolescent boy in Guinea)

d) Factors influencing levels of sexual violence

· Regional conflict;

· Prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse;

· High prevalence of sexual exploitation;

· Lack of reporting reinforced by the social stigma associated with being victim of sexual violence and negative experiences of legal and investigatory procedures.

End of report extract

Exercise: Financial and logistical planning

TASK

Using the Guinea/West Africa 'sex-for-food' abuse case as a loose framework, please plan financial, timing and logistical arrangements for a proposed evaluation:

- Include an outline budget, including all costs. You have some USD70,000 but may apply for more money if justified.
- Include a simple description of responsibilities of all main actors.
- Make a time-line (plan) for the entire evaluation, from inception to completion and dissemination. Include key actions (by whom, by when).
- Make any reasonable assumptions, as necessary. These may be based on the case, or on your own experience of such field operations.

You have 45 minutes

A practical budget framework

Worthen and Sanders (1987) provide a useful framework for developing an evaluation budget that can be modified as appropriate.

Staff salary and benefits

- The amount of time staff members must spend on assessment/monitoring/evaluation and the level of expertise necessary to perform certain tasks will affect costs.

Consultants

- If country staff need help, they might contract with external consultants. These consultants can provide special expertise and/or different perspectives throughout the process.

Travel

- Travel expenses for staff and/or team/consultants may vary from project to project. Programme/projects located in remote areas or programme/projects with multiple sites in different parts of the country may need a large travel budget.

Costs of surveys and data processing

- If relevant.

Printing and duplication

- These costs cover preparation of data-collection instruments, reports and any other documents.

Communications

- These include postage, telephone calls etc.

Support staff

- Translators, drivers and secretaries.

Printed materials

- These include the cost of acquiring data-collection instruments and library materials.

Supplies and equipment

- Specific items such as computers, packaged software that must be purchased or rented.

Non-financial or indirect costs

- Planners should consider the non-financial or indirect costs of evaluation; that is, the time and effort that people involved must contribute when away from their regular work.

Analysis: Definitions

Analysis

1. **Close examination:** the examination of something in detail in order to understand it better or draw conclusions from it

2. **Separation into components:** the separation of something into its constituents in order to find out what it contains, to examine individual parts, or to study the structure of the whole

3. **Assessment:** an assessment, description, or explanation of something, usually based on careful consideration or investigation

4. **List of parts:** a statement giving details of all the constituent parts of something and how they relate to each other

Hypothesis

1. **Theory needing investigation:** a tentative explanation for a phenomenon, used as a basis for further investigation. The hypothesis of the big bang is one way to explain the beginning of the universe.

2. **Assumption:** a statement that is assumed to be true for the sake of argument. That is what would logically follow if you accepted the hypothesis.

Dialectic

1. **Tension between conflicting ideas:** the tension that exists between two conflicting or interacting forces, elements, or ideas

2. **Investigation of truth through discussion:** the investigation of the truth through discussion, or the art of investigating truths through discussion

3. **Debate resolving conflict:** debate intended to resolve a conflict between two contradictory or apparently contradictory ideas or parts logically, establishing truths on both sides rather than disproving one argument (*takes a singular verb*)

4. **Hegelian process:** the process, in Hegelian and Marxist thought, in which two apparently opposed ideas, the thesis and antithesis, become combined in a unified whole, the synthesis

5. **Socratic method for revealing truth:** the methods used in Socratic philosophy to reveal truth through disputation

Reporting

Extract from chapter by John Telford, in Wood, A., Apthorpe, R. and J. Borton (2001) *Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from practitioners* London: Zed Press/ALNAP. **Chapter 10, pp183–185**

Writing up – *modus operandi*

It had been agreed from the beginning of the mission that each team member would write up the sectors and issues allotted to him or her. Common conclusions crystallised throughout - at team meetings, and through discussions during travel and meals. But, the relatively consistent concurrence of broad opinions was one thing. Concurrence on detail was another. Finer points of interpretation and emphasis only emerged in the first drafts that were produced at the start of the last week the team was together. Herein lies yet another dilemma. Such early drafting was perhaps too early in that it did not allow sufficient time for considered analysis and teasing out of more finely developed conclusions. Yet it was already late, as was proven, when it came to amalgamating texts and editing them into an initial report for circulation. **In short, however premature and tedious it might seem, the earlier the drafting begins while the team is still together, the better.**

While UNICEF had suggested to us that a sectoral format 'is not the most appropriate given the child rights framework which guides UNICEF activities', our report nevertheless followed a sectoral approach. This was for two reasons. Firstly, UNICEF itself organises its programmes and reports upon such sectoral categories. Secondly, a sectoral approach was a practical way of organising the report drafting given that it mirrored the division of responsibilities within the evaluation team. **The conclusions and related recommendations and lessons-learned were authored by the respective team member(s) covering each specific sector.**

Most of the overall editing of this material, obviously, had to be done by myself as Team Leader, in this case ably supported by the (evaluation manager) DFID desk officer. Editing was a challenge. The report is often the only remaining physical embodiment of the evaluation output. The final product ought to be of a high quality – clear, accurate, incisive and informative. But that is not enough. It ought to be engaging, so as to increase the chance that it will be read and used as a tool. **The devil is in the detail.** This is never as evident as when one must edit materials drafted by others. What is evident to the author (or appears to be evident) is not so necessarily for the reader. The author of a draft can take liberties with a text, knowing that it is not final, that a finalising editor may not. **Gaps in fact, and logic become glaringly obvious as text is 'cut and pasted'.**

The 'sub-reports' were submitted by each team-member. The main challenge was to minimise gaps and potential misunderstandings in the consolidated text, despite not having access to either the base material (notes and documentation collected by each individual author) or the logic of each of the authors (except for one's own text). This required a frenzied process of emails, cross-checking, reformatting (very time-consuming), complicated 'wordsmithing' in order to come up with formulae that could overcome the inevitable level of ambiguity. Finally, the inherent tensions of being 'all things to all people' (multiple expectations on the evaluation by the various potential readers) suddenly become glaringly obvious. **Panic nearly set in. Greater clarity on the drafting process throughout the evaluation would reduce these difficulties, perhaps, and more time should have been allocated to the writing process.**

Feedback makes matters worse. Contradictory comments on the drafts from the team initially, and then from DFID and UNICEF, must be reconciled, new drafts received, new circulations coordinated, and so on with what can easily become an endless round of consultations and revisions. There has to be an easier way. **If not careful, at a certain point, one can lose track and even perspective of the document.**

In short, more time for sharing drafts back-and-forward within the team, and at least one other day-long meeting (or professionally facilitated workshop) would have helped. So too, a clearly

planned process would have helped of when drafts would be submitted, by whom, circulated for comments to whom, and within what realistic time frame. (Field offices should be given at least a week to review documents). This would have helped us avoid some of the difficulties we encountered with the review of what was an unduly premature initial draft.

Debriefing and finalisation

UNICEF was invited to reply formally to the initial draft. The agency took the evaluation process, but especially this stage, very seriously. Senior staff were called to Geneva for the review. Despite deadlines that were too short for a large bureaucracy (they had to be extended), UNICEF replied in detail orally (in meetings and interviews in New York and Geneva) and in writing. While measured, courteous and diplomatic, underlying tensions were evident, questions of fact (or error, rather) emerged, albeit limited. The main complaints made repeatedly were to do with emphasis, and general balance. Some UNICEF staff seemed to see the evaluation as overly critical, and at times unjustifiably so. Considerable rewriting was proposed. UNICEF recommended that the first draft be renamed a 'zero draft'.

DFID's feedback reflected its interest in an evaluation that would include an 'accountability' focus. The feedback asked for specific answers to questions such as whether objectives had been met and how well. DFID officials wanted a more explicitly worded, rather than nuanced text.

The issue of criteria arose – do you evaluate against ideal standards, including those of the agency itself, and to what extent do you make allowances for constraints. Constraints include the inadequacies of other actors, in what is an increasingly interdependent web of operations and activities and programmes? Do you compare performance against that of peers, and take a 'least worst performance' approach, as opposed to a more critical evaluation of accountability against set objectives and standards?

Follow-up consultations were necessary by email, phone and additional interviews to clarify comments and questions raised in the responses to the draft report. These fed into the subsequent drafts. While many differences of perspective, some substantive, were addressed between UNICEF staff, DFID and the evaluators, interestingly enough, most of the overall conclusions and recommendations were gradually both implicitly and explicitly agreed. In fact, final comments emphasised that the problems highlighted were the same old weaknesses that had not been rectified. 'Old-hands' in UNICEF expressed resignation or surprise or a degree of cynicism that here were the same hoary old chestnuts being rolled out again.

The linkage, albeit indirect and secondary, between the evaluation and the ongoing DFID funded UNICEF capacity building project was important. Without the latter, the evaluation might not have taken place at all. Also, it prompted discussions and focus. That being said, clearly UNICEF were correctly concerned that the Kosovo case should not be generalised unduly. As stated above, a high degree of consensus was arrived at that many of the strengths and weaknesses identified had in fact been encountered previously. This was heartening, in that the capacity building project could continue to address these issues, but disheartening that it should still have to!

Evaluation use and dissemination: points of good practice

- Design a dissemination strategy at the outset
- Process of disseminating and discussing draft can enhance ownership and engagement
- People tend to learn/ remember more from hearing & discussing than from reading
- Lots of small/ short meetings with evaluation team may be more effective than wide dissemination of report
- Make use of short accessible summaries if the full evaluation is very long
- Design, and fund, a follow-up process (see, for example, the follow-up exercise after the multi-agency Rwanda evaluation)

Evaluation Follow-up: Procedures in MFA Norway and DANIDA

(from van de Putte, 2001)

MFA Norway

- MFA organises a seminar where the evaluation team presents its findings. This is done before the evaluation report is finished. All (Norwegian) stakeholders are invited, and usually attendance is good.
- After the report is completed, the role of the evaluation team is terminated. MFA sends the report for a second round of substantive comments. Most stakeholders know that their comments will be taken into consideration for the next step, so good use is usually made of this possibility to express views and opinions, at least by Norwegian stakeholders.
- On the basis of the evaluation report and the comments received, the evaluation unit writes recommendations for the Minister. These are (informally) discussed with key stakeholders, before they go to the Minister. The recommendations of the evaluation unit are discussed in a meeting with key stakeholders and the Minister or her representative. The unit's recommendations are agreed, rejected or amended in the meeting. When approved, the decisions are backed by the authority of the Minister.
- After this meeting the evaluation unit writes the minutes with the decisions taken. This is signed by the Secretary General (presently by his Deputy). A request for reporting on the implementation of the recommendations is attached to the minutes.
- After this the role of the evaluation unit is terminated. The monitoring of the implementation of the recommendations is done by the (Deputy) Secretary General.

DANIDA

During the final phases of the evaluation, the evaluators are invited to present their key findings. During this presentation, stakeholders are invited to reflect on recommendations.

Danida has a form to facilitate the follow-up to evaluations in general and this form is also applied evaluations of humanitarian programmes. The form has three columns: the recommendation, the action to be undertaken and the status of this action.

- When the final draft of the evaluation report is submitted to the evaluation department, this department transfers the recommendations in the relevant column of the format.
- It then contacts the departments concerned to formulate the action to be taken for the follow-up of the recommendation.
- The form with recommendations and follow-up action is discussed in the Management Meeting (often) chaired by the Minister. During this meeting the recommendations and the follow-up action indicated are discussed, and if needed adjusted or reformulated.
- When agreement is reached, the decision is taken and authorised by the chairman to execute the follow-up action as indicated. It thereby becomes an instruction to the concerned departments
- Six months or longer after the follow-up action has been decided, the evaluation unit approaches the departments with the format, and requests to indicate the status of the follow-up action.

ALNAP QUALITY PROFORMA

(as published in ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004)

To assess the quality of the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action (EHA) process through EHA reports

ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF HUMANITARIAN EVALUATIONS

THE ALNAP QUALITY PROFORMA 2005 (v. 02/03/05)

1. Background

ALNAP developed this Quality Proforma in 2000/2001 as a way of assessing humanitarian evaluation reports drawing on current thinking and good practice in the evaluation of humanitarian action[1]

The overall aim of the Quality Proforma is to improve the quality of humanitarian evaluation practice. It does this by:

1. Providing an assessment tool for ALNAP's annual meta-evaluation of humanitarian evaluation reports as part of its *Review of Humanitarian Action*[2] series. The meta-evaluation seeks to identify trends in the quality of humanitarian evaluations, identifying both good and weak practices.[3]

2. Providing a checklist for evaluation managers and evaluators.

The Quality Proforma has undergone refinements during its application in four ALNAP *Reviews* between 2001 and 2003/4, in order to strengthen consistency in interpretation and usage and reflect developments in current thinking in the evaluation of humanitarian action. This version of the Proforma has undergone a process of simplification and reordering for the *Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004* in order to make it more accessible.

2. Meta-evaluation process

Each evaluation report included in ALNAP's meta-evaluation is rated against the Quality Proforma by two assessors working independently. For each report, every area of the criteria is given a comment and a rating. The ratings are then used to assess strengths and weaknesses of the set as a whole.

Since 2003/4, the draft findings of the Quality Proforma assessments have been discussed with a selection of the commissioning agencies in order to better understand the background to the evaluation process, gather information that may not show up in the written report and stimulate agency involvement and interest. The outcome of these discussions may lead to revisions of the final assessments. In 2005 for the first time, a selection of evaluators will also be consulted on the evaluation processes.

3. Using the ALNAP Quality Proforma

The development of the Proforma is linked to ALNAP's definition of the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action (EHA) given in the box below.

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[1] Sources used in the development of the Proforma are listed at the end of this document.

[2] The *Annual Review* series was renamed *Review of Humanitarian Action* series in 2004.

[3] Two assessors are used for the meta-evaluation exercise to mitigate potential assessor bias

The Proforma is intended to be used for reports dealing with natural disasters and complex political emergencies. It should also be of value for other types of evaluative exercises in the humanitarian context. Although originally designed with programme evaluations in mind, the Proforma can also be used to review evaluations of such activities as humanitarian management processes, funding partnerships and sectoral approaches. In these cases, some questions in the Proforma may be noted as not relevant.

ALNAP Definition of Evaluation of Humanitarian Action (EHA)

"A systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice, and enhance accountability. It has the following characteristics: i). it is commissioned by or in cooperation with the organisation(s) whose performance is being evaluated; ii). it is undertaken either by a team of non-employees (external) or by a mixed team of non-employees (external) and employees (internal) from the commissioning organisation and/or the organisation being evaluated; iii). it assesses policy and/or practice against recognised criteria (e.g., efficiency, effectiveness/timeliness/coordination, impact, connectedness, relevance/appropriateness, coverage, coherence and as appropriate, protection); and, iv). it articulates findings, draws conclusions and makes recommendations." ALNAP 2001, *Humanitarian Action: Learning from evaluation*, ALNAP Annual Review 2001. London: ALNAP/ODI.

The Quality Proforma is divided into six sections:

1. Assessing the Terms of Reference;
2. Assessing Evaluation Methods, Practice and Constraints;
3. Assessing Contextual Analysis;
4. Assessing the Intervention;
5. Assessing the Report;
6. Overall Comments.

Each section has four column headings:

- **Area of Enquiry** (subject matter)
- **Guidance Notes** (guidance as to what is deemed 'satisfactory' to ensure a degree of consistency of interpretation)
- **Comments** (to include a brief reason for the rating given)
- The **Rating**.

The rating system used for the meta-evaluation is as follows:

A = Good
B = Satisfactory
C = Unsatisfactory
D = Poor
Z = Not applicable. (Where an area of enquiry is deemed not applicable, reasons should be given in the 'Comments' column. The proforma user's judgement remains a central factor in the rating exercise.)

Where the Guidance Note lists a number of areas that should be covered for an Area of Enquiry, a 'B' (Satisfactory) rating will normally only be given if the report is judged to be satisfactory in all those areas.

In some cases, the assessors may note in the Comments section that the rating is borderline, indicating that it is a matter of fine judgement as to whether the rating falls into one category or another. This most often happens when the assessors are deciding between B or C ratings.

The Glossary defines many of the terms used in this Proforma.

The ALNAP proforma

EVALUATION TITLE	
COMMISSIONING AGENCY	
DATE OF REPORT	
NAME AND POSITION OF ASSESSOR	
REASON FOR ASSESSMENT	
DATE OF ASSESSMENT	
DATE OF AGENCY INTERVIEW (if held)	

Section 1. Assessing the Terms of Reference (ToR)

Area of enquiry	Guidance Notes	Comments	Rating
1.1 The Terms of Reference	The ToR should clearly describe: The work to be evaluated including its objectives and key stakeholders. The purpose, objectives and focus of the evaluation *(Purpose might be donor requirement, accountability, lesson learning, community empowerment. Focus might be on partner performance, programme, project, policy, institutional analysis, sector, coordination).* The intended use and users of the evaluation outputs and the individual or department responsible for follow-up. The desired report framework. (*A sample framework is outlined in Annex 2).* The rationale for the timing of the evaluation. The evaluator selection process (e.g., competitive bidding, standing offer).		
1.2 Expectation of good evaluation practice	The TOR should clarify the commissioning agency's expectation of good humanitarian evaluation practice. *(e.g., application of DAC criteria;[4] reference to international standards including international law; multi-method approach i.e., quantitative and qualitative; consultation with key stakeholders to inform findings, conclusions and recommendations; and gender analysis).*		

Section 2. Assessing Evaluation Methods, Practice and Constraints

Area of enquiry	Guidance Notes	Comments	Rating
2.1 Nature, make up and appropriateness and biases of the evaluation team	The report should outline the nature (e.g., external or mixed) and make up of the team (e.g., sectoral expertise, local knowledge, gender balance) and its appropriateness for the evaluation. The evaluation report should outline the evaluator(s)' biases that might have affected the evaluation and how these have been counteracted.		

[4] See Section 5.3 for criteria definitions drawn from OECD/DAC (1999) *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*, Paris.

2.2 Clarification process	The evaluation report should outline any clarification process between the commissioning agency and the evaluation team about the scope and methods of the evaluation that resulted in modifications to the ToR.		
2.3 Appropriateness of the overall evaluation methods	The evaluation methods should be clearly outlined in the report and their appropriateness, relative to the evaluation's primary purpose, focus and users, should be explained pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the methods.		
2.4 Consultation with and participation by primary stakeholders	The evaluation report should outline the nature and scope of consultation with, and participation by, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within the affected population in the evaluation process. (A satisfactory or higher rating should only be given where evidence is presented of adequate consultation and participation of primary stakeholders in the evaluation process, or where, in the assessor's view, it has been successfully argued as inappropriate due to security or other reasons.) The evaluation report should outline the nature and scope of consultation with other key stakeholders in the evaluation process. The report should include a list of the other key stakeholders who were consulted or who participated in the evaluation process.		
2.5 The use of and adherence to international standards	The evaluation report should assess the intervention against appropriate international standards (e.g., international humanitarian and human rights law; the Red Cross/ NGO Code of Conduct, Sphere).		
2.6 Evaluation constraints	The evaluation report should outline key constraints to carrying out the evaluation (e.g., lack of time, difficult travelling conditions, lack of baseline data, poor agency monitoring systems, lack of access to key information sources, difficulties setting up control groups, use of translators), and the effect of these constraints.		

Section 3. Assessing Contextual Analysis

Area of enquiry	Guidance Notes	Comments	Rating
3.1 Analysis of context and of the crisis to which the intervention is responding	The evaluation report should provide analysis of the affected area and population *(including relevant historical, social, economic, political and cultural factors)* to inform the evaluation and draw on this information in the text to support the analysis of the intervention. The evaluation report should provide a clear analysis of the crisis, including key events (and a chronology where appropriate).		
3.2 Past involvement of the agency and its local partners	The evaluation report should provide analysis of the implementing agency's and its local partners' past involvement and main areas of work, so that the influence of the agency's past involvement on the intervention, including its geographical and sectoral focus, can be understood.		

Section 4. Assessing the Intervention

4.1 Institutional Considerations			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
4.1.i The agency's guiding policies and principles	The evaluation report should provide an analysis of the extent to which agency policies and principles were applied, and their relevance to and effect on the intervention.		
4.1.ii The agency's management and human resources	The evaluation report should provide an analysis of the agency's management and human resource procedures and practices as applied and their effect on the intervention. *(This might include: level of experience/expertise of field staff; use of national and expatriate staff; staff turnover; field/HQ communications & relations; briefing and debriefing procedures; training and learning practices; security)*		

4.2 Needs Assessment, Objectives, Planning and Implementation			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
4.2.i The needs and livelihoods assessments that informed the intervention	The evaluation report should provide analysis of the needs and livelihoods assessment practices that informed the intervention and their effect on the intervention.		
4.2.ii Intervention objectives	The evaluation report should assess the relevance of the intervention objectives to the contextual analysis and needs/livelihoods assessments assessed in 3.1 and 4.2.i above.		
4.2.iii Programme cycle processes.	The evaluation report should provide analysis of the following processes and their effect on the intervention: planning implementation monitoring and/or real-time evaluative mechanisms intervention expenditure. *(Consideration in this analysis should be given to local capacities; primary stakeholder consultation and participation; local and national partnerships)*		

4.3 Application of EHA Criteria			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
	The evaluation report should provide evidence of an adequate application of standard evaluation of humanitarian action criteria as per the OECD/DAC definitions given below:[5]		
4.3.i Efficiency (including cost-effectiveness)	Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used. Cost-effectiveness looks beyond how inputs were converted into outputs, to whether different outputs could have been produced that would have had a greater impact in achieving the project purpose.		
4.3.ii Effectiveness (including timeliness)	Effectiveness measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is **timeliness** of the response. (*Although **coordination** is not a formal criterion, the OECD/DAC Guidance suggests that given its importance, it should be considered under this criterion).*		
4.3.iii Impact	Impact looks at the wider effects of the project - social, economic, technical, environmental - on individuals, gender, age-groups, communities, and institutions.		
4.3.iv Relevance/ appropriateness	Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy). It refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme. Appropriateness - the need to tailor humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly … is more focused on the activities and inputs. (Minear, 1994)		

[5] from OECD/DAC (1999) *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. Paris, pp 30-32.

4.3.v Sustainability/ connectedness	Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. … many humanitarian interventions, in contrast to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable. They still need assessing, however, in regard to whether, in responding to acute and immediate needs, they take the longer-term into account. (*Minear (1994) has referred to this as connectedness, the need… to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account.)*		
4.3.vi Coverage	The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas.		
4.3.vii Coherence	Coherence refers to policy coherence, and the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations.		

4.4 Consideration given to Cross-cutting Issues			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
4.4.i The use of and adherence to international standards	The evaluation report should assess the extent to which relevant international standards were used in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the intervention *(e.g., international humanitarian and human rights law; the Red Cross/ NGO Code of Conduct and developing standards - e.g., Sphere)*		
4.4.ii Gender Equality	The evaluation report should analyse consideration given to gender equality throughout the intervention and the effect on the intervention. *(i.e. was gender equality taken into consideration in all relevant areas? Did the intervention conform to the implementing organisation's gender equality policy? It should be noted if there is no gender equality policy).*		
4.4.iii Protection	The evaluation report should analyse the consideration given to protection throughout the intervention cycle and the effect on the intervention.		
4.4.iv Capacity building	The evaluation report should analyse the consideration given to the capacity building of key and primary stakeholders government and civil society institutions, and the effect of this on the intervention.		
4.4.v Advocacy	The evaluation report should analyse consideration given to advocacy and the effect on the intervention. *(e.g., attempts to influence donors, partners, government, concerning their policies or actions).*		
4.4.vi Vulnerable and marginalised groups	The evaluation report should provide an analysis of consideration given to vulnerable and marginalised groups (e.g., elderly, disabled, children, HIV/AIDS sufferers) and to other groups that suffer discrimination and disadvantage.		

Section 5. Assessing the Report

5.1 Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
5.1.i Secondary sources	The evaluation report should use and refer to relevant secondary sources to support its findings, conclusions and recommendations (*a satisfactory or higher rating should only be given where a reference list of secondary sources is included as part of the report).*		

5.1.ii Conclusions	The report's conclusions should flow logically from, and reflect, the report's central findings. The report should provide a clear and defensible basis for value judgements in each case.		
5.1.iii Recommendations	Recommendations should be clear, relevant and implementable, reflecting any constraints to follow up. Recommendations should follow on from the main conclusions and reflect consultation with key stakeholders. The evaluation report should suggest a prioritisation of recommendations, timeframe for implementation and suggest where responsibility for follow-up should lie if that is not indicated in the ToR.		

5.2 Report Coverage, Legibility and Accessibility			
Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**	**Rating**
5.2.i Coverage of the evaluation report	The evaluation report should adequately cover all areas specified in the ToR and additional factors that affected the performance of the intervention.		
5.2.ii Format of the report	The evaluation report format should follow that outlined in the ToR (*if the ToR did not propose a format for the report, this area should be assessed on the basis of the good practice suggested in Annex 2).*		
5.2.iii Accessibility of the report	The evaluation report should cater for the intended readership and users (*In general reports should use language clearly; be succinct; be clearly laid out e.g. with different information levels and appropriate visual aids. Some organisations have their own style guides).*		
5.2.iv Executive Summary	The executive summary should reflect the format of the main text, and clearly outline key evaluation conclusions and recommendations.		

Section 6. Overall Comments *(for information purposes and not rated)*

Area of enquiry	**Guidance Notes**	**Comments**
6.i Comments on issues not covered above.	This is an opportunity for comment on any issues not covered by the areas of enquiry.	
6.ii Overall comments on the report.	This is an opportunity to make an overall comment on the report, including its strengths and weaknesses.	

ALNAP proforma: glossary

Accountability

Accountability is the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions. (Edwards & Hulme, 1995).

Advocacy

Advocacy refers in a broad sense to efforts to promote, in the domain of humanitarian aid, respect for humanitarian principles and law with a view to influencing the relevant political authorities, whether recognised governments, insurgent groups or other non-state actors. (SDC, 2004).[6] One could add "international, national and local assistance agencies".

Appropriateness

The need to "tailor humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly" (Minear 1994) is more focused on the activities and inputs. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

Coherence

Refers to the policy coherence and the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations. (DAC Evaluation Criteria)

Complex political emergency

A situation with complex social, political and economic origins which involves the breakdown of state structures, the disputed legitimacy of host authorities, the abuse of human rights and possibly armed conflict, that creates humanitarian needs. The term is generally used to differentiate humanitarian needs arising from conflict and instability from those that arise from natural disasters. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

Conclusions

Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results and impacts, and more generally to any other strength or weakness. A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken through a transparent chain of arguments. (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management, 2002)

Context (of an evaluation)

The combination of factors accompanying the study that may have influenced its results, including geographic location, timing, political and social climate, economic conditions, and other relevant professional activities in progress at the same time. (Programme Policy and Procedures Manual, UNICEF, May 2003)

Cost Effectiveness Analysis (see also 4.3.i above)

Cost-effectiveness analysis entails comparing costs across different strategies for achieving a given outcome, with a view to determining the lowest cost approach. For example, cost-effectiveness analysis might explore three different approaches to getting girls working in the informal sector back

[6] Definitions of advocacy within the humanitarian sector appear to be very limited (SDC, 2004).

into school. As compared to cost-efficiency analysis, it is wider in scope, looking beyond outputs to outcomes. (M&E Training Resources, UNICEF, 2004)

Coverage

The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agenda. (DAC Evaluation Criteria)

Effectiveness

Effectiveness measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is **timeliness** of the response. Although **coordination** is not a formal criterion, the OECD/DAC Guidance suggests that given its importance, it should be considered under this criterion. (DAC Evaluation Criteria)

Humanitarian action

Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

Impact

Impact looks at the wider effects of the project - social, economic, technical, environmental - on individuals, gender, age-groups, communities, and institutions. (DAC Evaluation Criteria)

Impartiality

An approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance and services which is non-discriminatory, proportionate to needs and free of subjective distinction. A guiding principle of organisations claiming to be humanitarian. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

Input

The financial, human, material, technological and information resources used for the intervention. (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management Proposed Harmonized Terminology, 2002)

Lesson learned

Conclusions that can be generalized beyond the specific case. This could include lessons that are of relevance more broadly within the country situation or globally, to an organization or the broader international community. (Programme Policy and Procedures Manual, UNICEF, May 2003)

Lesson-learning study

A study initiated by an organisation with the explicit objective of lesson-learning within that organisation, but that falls outside the full evaluation definition. A process that may be facilitated by external consultants but is generally an internal process.(ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

Meta-evaluation

Simply stated, meta-evaluation is the evaluation of an evaluation, evaluation system or evaluation device (Hummel 2003). A process of delineating, obtaining, and applying descriptive information and judgmental information – about the utility, feasibility, propriety and accuracy of an evaluation and its

systematic nature, competent conduct, integrity/honesty, respectfulness and social responsibility – to guide the evaluation and/or report its strengths and weaknesses (Stufflebeam)

Outcome

The intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. Outcomes represent changes in conditions which occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact. (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management Proposed Harmonized Terminology, 2002)

Output

The products and services which result from the completion of activities within an intervention. (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management Proposed Harmonized Terminology, 2002)

Protection

Activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian and refugee law) which are conducted impartially and not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary, 2003)

Relevance

Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy) … refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme. (DAC Evaluation Criteria)

Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances. (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management, 2002)

Stakeholder

All those – from agencies to individuals – who have a direct or indirect interest in the humanitarian intervention, or who affect or are affected by the implementation and outcome of it. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003). Within the context of the Quality Proforma **'primary stakeholders'** refers to both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within the affected population.

Sustainability

Sustainability 'is concerned with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn … many humanitarian interventions, in contrast to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable. They still need assessing, however, in regard to whether, in responding to acute and immediate needs, they take the longer term into account. (DAC Evaluation Criteria). Minear has referred to this as *Connectedness. Connectedness*, the need "to assure that activities of a short term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account" (Minear, 1994).

Terms of Reference

Terms of reference define the requirements and paramters for conducting an evaluation. (ALNAP Annual Review Glossary 2003)

ALNAP proforma: evaluation report format - check list

Preliminaries	
	Title page (should include date of report)
	List of contents with page numbers
	Acronyms
	Map(s)
	Executive Summary
Main text	
	Introduction (including motivation for commissioning evaluation, purpose of study, scope, approach, methods, composition of team, constraints)
	Context in which humanitarian action took place, humanitarian context and response
	Findings
	Conclusions
	Recommendations
Annexes	
	Sources/bibliography
	ToR
	Timetable
	Evaluation team profiles
	List of Interviewees
	Timeline
	Evaluation Material (questionnaires etc)
	Collated stakeholder feedback on findings, conclusions and recommendations
	Other appendices/annexes

ALNAP Proforma: References

ALNAP (2003) *Humanitarian Action: Improving Monitoring to Enhance Accountability and Learning. ALNAP Annual Review 2003*. London: ALNAP.

Apthorpe, R. (2000) K*osovo Humanitarian Programme Evaluations: Towards Synthesis, Meta-Analysis and Sixteen Propositions for Discussion.* Background Paper for the ALNAP Symposium '***Learning*** from Evaluation: Humanitarian Assistance and Protection in Kosovo' 17th & 18th October 2000, Geneva (London: ALNAP)

Minear, L. (1994) *The International Relief System: a critical review*. Paper presented to the Parallel National Intelligence Estimate on Global National Emergencies, Meridian International Centre, Washington DC, September 2002.

OECD/DAC (1999) *Guidance for Evaluation Humanitarian Action in Complex Emergencies*. Paris: OECD/DEC

OECD/DAC (2002) *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-based Management Proposed Harmonized Terminology*. Paris: OECD/DAC.

Patton, M. (1997) *Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century Text* (Thousand Oaks: Sage)

Raynard, P. (2000) *Mapping Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance* (London: ALNAP)

SPHERE (2000) *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva: The Sphere Project)

SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) 2004 *Advocacy Guidelines: Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation*. Berne: SDC, March.

UNICEF (2003) *Programme Policy and Procedures Manual.* UNICEF, May

Valadez, J. and M. Bamberger (1994) *Monitoring and Evaluating Social Programs in Developing Countries: A Handbook for Policymakers, Managers and Researchers* (Washington DC: World Bank EDI Development Series)

Wood, A., Borton, J. and R. Apthorpe (eds.) (2001) Evaluating *International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners* (London: Zed Press)

Course Evaluation

Your name _____

Overall evaluation: Please circle the corresponding rating you give the course

Outstanding	Very Good	Good	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
1	2	3	4	5

Would you recommend this course to your colleagues? **YES** **NO**

What course elements were the most useful/interesting for you?

Which elements of the course were the least useful/interesting for you?

What changes, if any, would you recommend for any future such courses?

Additional comments, if any (please use an additional sheet, if required):

Annex I: Defining Our Terms

The evaluation of humanitarian action involves a range of concepts and terms. Often these terms are defined and used somewhat differently depending on the user, the context and their organisational perspective. It is important therefore to attempt to define the terms, even if only to establish the basis for the use of a particular term. The following definitions have been selected from the sources indicated.

Evaluation

"The process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or programme. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or completed development intervention. The aim is to determine the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partner and donor" (DAC, 2001a).

Humanitarian Evaluation

"A systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and practice and enhance accountability."

(ALNAP, 2001)

For the purposes of selecting evaluation reports on humanitarian action to be included in the Annual Review synthesis and meta-evaluation processes, the following characteristics of an 'Evaluation of Humanitarian Action' were agreed by the ALNAP Steering Committee following a consultation with the ALNAP Full Members:

- It is commissioned by or in co-operation with the organisation(s) whose performance is being evaluated.
- It is undertaken either by a team of non-employees (external) or by a mixed team of non-employees (external) and employees (internal) from the commissioning organisation and/or the organisation being evaluated.
- It assesses policy and/or practice against recognised criteria: e.g. efficiency, effectiveness/timeliness/co-ordination, impact, connectedness, relevance/appropriateness, coverage, coherence and, as appropriate, protection.
- It articulates findings, draws conclusions and makes recommendations.

(ALNAP, 2001)

Humanitarian Action

"Action undertaken for the advancement of the welfare of humanity without regard to race, religion or politics" (Gunn 1990)

Audit

"An independent, objective assurance activity designed to add value and improve an organisation's operations. It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined

approach to evaluation and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. … Regularity (financial) audit focuses on the compliance with applicable statutes and regulations. Performance audit is concerned with the audit of relevance, economy, efficiency and effectiveness" (DAC 2001a)

Monitoring

"A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds" (DAC, 2001a)

	Monitoring	**Evaluation**
Objectives	To collect information to improve immediate management decisions on the activity being monitored	To collect information to determine general relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of an investment
Main users	Internal managers	Wider groups of decision-makers
Timing	Continuous during implementation	Occasional, during and/or after implementation

(Table from 'Evaluation Guidelines' www.dfid.gov)

Review

"A periodic assessment of the performance of the project… More than monitoring but less than evaluation. An evaluation is more comprehensive and places greater emphasis on impact" (DFID, 2001 draft)

Project Cycle

"The sequence of stages involved in the planning, implementation, operation and evaluation of a project"

(Valadez and Bamberger, 1994)

Project Cycle Management

A methodology for the preparation, implementation and evaluation of projects and programmes based on the integrated approach and the logical framework approach"

(European Commission, 2001)

Performance, Performance Measurement and Performance Assessment

Performance

"The degree to which a development intervention or a development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans" (DAC, 2001a)

Performance Measurement

"A system for assessing performance of development interventions against stated goals" (DAC, 2001a)

	Performance Assessment	**Independent Evaluation**
Type of information	What is achieved	What, why and how it is achieved
Degree of Independence	Self-assessment by managers	Teams contain independent evaluators
Timing	Routine	Occasional
Coverage	Wide	Selective
Contribution to accountability	Substantial, but lacks independence	Essential
Contribution to lesson-learning	Limited	Significant

(Table from 'Evaluation Guidelines' www.dfid.gov)

Logical Framework (Log frame)

"Management tool used to improve the design of development interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements (inputs, outputs, purpose, goal) and their causal relationships, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, executions and evaluation of a development intervention"

Result, Results Framework and Results-Based Management

Result

"The measurable output or impact (intended or unintended, positive and negative) of a development intervention" (DAC, 2001a)

Results Framework

"The programme logic that explains how the development objective is to be achieved, including causal relationships and underlying assumptions" (DAC, 2001a)

Results-Based Management (RBM)

"A management strategy focussing on performance and achievement of outcomes and impacts" (DAC, 2001a)

Key Elements or Phases of RBM

(From DAC 2001b)

1. Identifying clear and measurable objectives (results) aided by logical frameworks

2. Selecting indicators that will be used to measure progress towards each objective

3. Setting explicit targets for each indicator to judge performance

4. Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect data on actual results

5. Reviewing, analysing and reporting actual results vis-à-vis the targets

6. Integrating evaluations to provide complementary performance information not readily available from performance monitoring systems

7. Using performance information for internal management accountability, learning and decision-making processes and also for external performance reporting to stakeholders

   1-3 = Results Oriented Planning (Strategic Planning)

   1-5 = Performance Measurement

   1-7 = Essential to an effective RBM system

References

- *ALNAP (2001)* Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation *ALNAP Annual Review 2001, London: ALNAP*

- *DAC (2001a) 'Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management Terms' DCD/DAC/EV(2001)3 Working Party on Aid Evaluation Paris: OECD*

- *DAC (2001b) 'Results Based Management in the Development Co-operation Agencies: A Review of Experience Executive Summary' Working Party on Aid Evaluation (November) Paris: OECD*

- *DFID (2001) 'Evaluation Guidelines' www.dfid.gov*

- *European Commission (2001) 'Project Cycle Management Manual' EuoropeAid Co-operation Office Brussels: European Commission*

http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methods/PCM_Manual_EN-march2001.pdf

- *Gunn, s (1990)* Multilingual Dictionary of Disaster Medicine and International Relief *Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic*

- *Valadez, J., and Bamberger, M. (1994)* Monitoring and Evaluating Social Programs in Developing Countries: A Handbook for Policymakers, Managers, and Researchers *World Bank Institute Development Studies, Washington: World Bank.*

Annex II: Evaluation Types

From: DAC (2001) 'Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management Terms' DCD/DAC/EV (2001) Working Party on Aid Evaluation Paris: OECD

Cluster evaluation

An evaluation of a set of related activities, projects and/or programmes

Country Programme Evaluation/Country Assistance Evaluation

Evaluation of one or more donor's or agency's portfolio of development interventions, and the assistance strategy behind them, in a partner country.

Ex-ante evaluation

An evaluation that is performed before implementation

Ex-post evaluation

Evaluation of a development intervention after it has been completed.

External evaluation

The evaluation of a development intervention conducted by entities and individuals at arm's length (i.e. at least not reporting to the same manager) from the implementing organization and its partners.

Formative evaluation

Evaluation intended to improve performance, most often conducted during the design and/or implementation phases of projects or programmes.

Independent evaluation

An evaluation carried out by entities and persons free of control by those responsible for the design and implementation of the development intervention.

Internal evaluation

Evaluation of a development intervention conducted by a unit and/or individuals reporting to the management of the donor, partner, or implementing organization.

Joint Evaluation

An evaluation to which different donor agencies and/or partners contribute.

Meta-evaluation

The term is used for evaluations designed to aggregate findings from a series of evaluations. It can also be used to denote the evaluation of an evaluation to judge its quality and/or assess the performance of the evaluators.

Mid-term evaluation

Evaluation performed towards the middle of the period of implementation of the intervention.

Participatory evaluation

Evaluation in which representatives of agencies and stakeholders (including beneficiaries) work together in designing, carrying out and interpreting an evaluation.

Process evaluation

An evaluation of the internal dynamics of the implementing organizations, their policy instruments, their service delivery mechanisms, their management practices, and the linkages among these.

Programme evaluation

Evaluation of a set of development interventions, marshalled to attain specific global, regional, country, or sector development objectives.

Project evaluation

Evaluation of an individual development intervention designed to achieve specific objectives within specified resources and implementation schedules, often within the framework of a broader programme.

Sector programme evaluation

Evaluation of a cluster of development interventions within one country or across countries, all of which contribute to the achievement of a specific development goal.

Self-evaluation

An evaluation by those who are entrusted with the design and delivery of a development intervention.

Thematic Evaluation

Evaluation of a selection of development interventions, all of which address a specific development priority that cuts across countries, regions, and sectors.

Annex III: Tools and Sources for EHA

This is based on a listing prepared by John Borton in 2002. It is intended to indicate those tools and sources which are considered to be most relevant to participants. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

Guides

- ODI (2006) Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC criteria. An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies
- ALNAP (2002) ALNAP Quality Proforma: The Evaluation Of Humanitarian Action (EHA) Process As Revealed By Evaluation Reports (see ALNAP Annual Review series)
- OECD-DAC 1999 'Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies' Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Paris.
- Hallam, Alistair 1998 'Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies' *Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN) Good Practice Review No 7*, Overseas Development Institute, London
- DFID (2001) Evaluation Guidelines London: Department for International Development
- http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ (Search for Evaluation Guidelines)
- CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1999) Framework For Program Evaluation In Public Health, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) 17th September 1999, Vol. 48, No. RR-11. http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/RR4811.pdf
- Van der Eyken, W. (1999) *Managing Evaluation* London: Charities Evaluation Services www.ces-vol.org.uk
- USAID – Evaluation Tips; A series of pdf files covering topics such as:
    - Establishing Performance Targets; Selecting Performance Indicators; Preparing an Evaluation Scope of Work; Conducting a Participatory Evaluation; Guidelines for Indicator and Data Quality; etc.
    - http://www.dec.org/usaid_eval/#004
- UNICEF (March 2001) *Monitoring and Evaluation Training Modules CD-ROM: Managing M & E Activities and M & E in crisis and Unstable Contexts* New York: UNICEF Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning www.unicef.org

Books

- Wood, A., Apthorpe, R., and Borton, J. (eds.) (2001) *Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners* London: Zed Books/ALNAP
- Patton, M. (1997) *Utilization-Focussed Evaluation: The New Century Text* Edition 3 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Shadish, W., Cook, T., and Leviton, L. (1991) *Foundations of Program Evaluation: Theories of Practice* Newbury Park, CA: Sage

- Valadez, J., and Bamberger, M. (1994) *Monitoring and Evaluating Social Programs in Developing Countries: A Handbook for Policymakers, Managers, and Researchers* World Bank Institute Development Studies, Washington: World Bank

- Weiss, C. (1998) *Evaluation* Second Edition Saddle Hall, NJ: Prentice Hall

- ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action (previously Annual Review) series. These are published annually and include some or all of the following:

    - a synthesis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of EHA evaluations placed on ALNAP's Evaluative Reports Database during the preceding year

    - a meta-evaluation using the ALNAP Quality Proforma: the evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) process as revealed by evaluation reports

    - the latest published version of the Quality Proforma

    - a chapter on a selected quality, accountability or learning theme.

Other key documents

- Raynard, P. (2000) 'Mapping Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance'. Report presented to ALNAP at the bi-annual meeting in April 2000 and revised to reflect comments received ***http://www.alnap.org/pdfs/other_studies/praccountability.pdf***

Professional Societies

All evaluation societies organise conferences and meetings and keep their members informed of relevant developments, trends, publications and upcoming events. Some evaluation societies sponsor evaluation journals and members are offered reduced subscription rates. Increased membership of such societies by those involved in the evaluation of humanitarian action will help encourage the wider evaluation community to engage with the issues faced in the evaluation of humanitarian action. 'Southern' evaluation societies also offer a useful way for 'northern' managers of evaluation processes to establish contact with national and local evaluators and consultants in the country or the region where an evaluation is planned.

African Evaluation Association (AfrEA)

Umbrella association of 20 plus national evaluation networks and associations. UNICEF has been very active in supporting the formation and development of these networks and the African Evaluation Association Contact: Mahesh Patel mpatel@unicef.org

The AfrEA website is at http://www.afrea.org/index.htm

American Evaluation Association

By far the largest professional evaluation society the AEA provides a focus for evaluation managers, evaluators and researchers around the world.

www.eval.org/

Associazone Italiana di Valutazione

www.valutazione.it/

Australasian Evaluation Society

http://www.aes.asn.au/

Canadian Evaluation Society

www.evaluationcanada.ca/

European Evaluation Society

www.europeanevaluation.org/

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Evaluation

http://www.degeval.de/

Inter-American Roundtable on Evaluation and Performance Measurement

A network of government departments, universities and professional associations in Latin America and the Caribbean involved in evaluations. Members include a Central American Evaluation Association

http://www.iadb.org/evo/roundtable/about.htm#

International Development Evaluation Association

The International Development Evaluation Association (IDEAS) is currently being formed. Sponsored jointly by the UNDP Evaluation Office and the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department it will seek to represent evaluators and development practitioners, mostly from the developing world. A launch event is planned for 2002.

Malaysian Evaluation Society

http://www.angelfire.com/ab/mes/

Société Française de l'Évaluation

http://www.sfe.asso.fr/

Sri Lanka Evaluation Association (SLEvA)

http://www.naresa.ac.lk/sleva/profile.htm

Société Suisse de l'Évaluation

http://www.seval.ch/

UK Evaluation Society (UKES)

http://www.evaluation.org.uk/

Journals

Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice SAGE publications (London, Thousand Oaks CA and Delhi)

www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/

Evaluation and Program Planning published quarterly by Elsevier Science

http://www.elsevier.com/inca/publications/store/5/9/3/

Evaluation Review: A Journal of Applied Social Research published quarterly by Sage Publications

http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/j0092.html

Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation published twice a year by the University of Calgary Press for the Canadian Evaluation Society

www.evaluationcanada.ca/

American Journal of Evaluation (formerly *Evaluation Practice*) published three times a year by Elsevier Science and sponsored by the American Evaluation Association

http://www.elsevier.com/inca/publications/store/6/2/0/1/8/2/index.htt

Websites

ALNAP

www.alnap.org

As well as information on the ALNAP membership, ALNAP activities and the results of studies commissioned by ALNAP the site contains the Evaluative Reports Database.

The Evaluative Reports Database contains some 750 reports (April 2007), most of which are evaluations commissioned by ALNAP Member agencies.

The website formerly included a Useful Resources Database containing details of various books, reports, etc., identified as useful by ALNAP members and Secretariat. This facility was withdrawn as visit statistics showed that the usage did not justify the work needed to maintain it. Some of the documents previously held may be available on application to the ALNAP Secretariat in London.

OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation

www.oecd.org then click on “Development” and then on “Evaluation”

Contains WPAE publications, a database of evaluations undertaken by DAC member organisations and links.

Charities Evaluation Service (CES)

www.ces-vol.org.uk

Offers evaluation services for NGOs and publishes tools and guidance

M & E News

www.mande.co.uk/news.htm

A news service focusing on developments in monitoring and evaluation methods relevant to development projects and programmes with social development objectives. Short summaries of planned and ongoing work, News update facility and good links to other Monitoring and

Evaluation sites. The M & E News site is supported by OXFAM (GB), Save the Children Fund (UK), Action Aid (UK), Water Aid, CAFOD and Christian Aid

Parc (Performance Assessment Resource Centre)

http://www.parcinfo.org/

Resource centre established in Birmingham, UK with support from DFID Evaluation Department

Discussion Groups

American Evaluation Association TIGs

The AEA and its members maintain more than 30 Topical Interest Groups (TIGs) covering areas such as: Collaborative, Participatory and Empowerment Evaluation; Evaluation Managers and Supervisors; Human Services Evaluation, International and Cross Cultural Evaluation; Human Services Evaluation. Most TIGs have their own officers, means of communicating with members, and special events. All TIGs co-ordinate their efforts through the AEA and participate actively in AEA's annual conference. Each TIG receives conference paper proposals in their area of interest and sets up a series of paper sessions and panels for the conference. Members of AEA may join up to five Topical Interest Groups.

http://www.eval.org/TIGs/tig.html

XCEval

The listserv of the International and Cross-Cultural Evaluation Topical Interest Group (A TIG of the American Evaluation Association).

A mix of professional evaluation managers, evaluators, academics undertaking international evaluations. Contains several development and humanitarian evaluation managers. A place to post 'help' questions, monitor/participate in discussions and keep in touch with forthcoming events. Generates 5-10 emails/week.

To subscribe to XCEval go to the I&CCE TIG homepage at http://home.wmis.net/~russon/icce/ type in your email address in the "Subscribe" box and click "Join".

Courses

ALNAP prepared a matrix of evaluation training courses in late 2001 as part of its development of EHA training modules. The matrix was disseminated to ALNAP members in November 2001. Resources available have not allowed for the updating of this matrix.

However a catalogue of 'development evaluation' training is maintained by the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. Global Development Evaluation Training Catalogue

http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/oed/evalcat.nsf?opendatabase