EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE IN AFRICA: EPIDEMIOLOGY AND HEALTH FACILITY RELATED TRANSMISSION:

A review of current literature and up date data from the field. April 2015

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SUMMARY

The 2014/15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, primarily affecting Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia has exceeded all previous Ebola outbreaks in the number of cases and in international response. By April 2015 there had been over 25,000 cases and over 10,500 deaths. There have been 20 significant outbreaks of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in sub-Saharan Africa prior to the 2014 outbreak, the largest being that in Uganda in 2000, with 425 cases and a mortality of 53%. Since the first outbreaks in Sudan and Zaire in 1976, transmission within health facilities has been of major concern, affecting both health care workers, and acting as amplifiers of spread into the community. The lack of resources for infection control and personal protective equipment are the main reasons for health facility transmission. Local strategies to improve infection control, and a greater understanding of local community views on the disease have helped to bring outbreaks under control. Recommendations from previous outbreaks include improved disease surveillance to enable more rapid health responses, the wider availability of personal protective equipment, and greater international preparedness.
INTRODUCTION

The current 2014 extensive outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in West Africa has resulted in more cases and deaths than all previous EVD outbreaks combined. There has been a particularly high transmission to, and mortality in health care workers (HCW’s).

Health facility transmission has been a major cause of morbidity and mortality in EVD since the first outbreaks described in Sudan and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC) in 1976. Despite the increased understanding of Ebola transmission and the availability of clear and structured guidelines by WHO and other agencies, by April 2015 the current outbreak in West Africa, had led to documented infection in 864 health staff with 503 deaths. In addition, health facility transmission may occur to family attendants, in both health care and community settings.

Person to person transmission of Ebola virus is by direct contact with the body fluids of a symptomatic case, there is no confirmed evidence of aerosol transmission during outbreaks, though this has been demonstrated in animal studies. The incubation period is 2-21 days. EVD clinical features include fever, fatigue, headache, myalgia, gastrointestinal symptoms and abdominal pain. Not all patients develop haemorrhagic symptoms, but infectivity may begin from the onset of symptoms by body fluids other than blood. Infective contact may occur during patient care in a health facility or in the community, and during burial rituals of a deceased case.

The animal reservoir of Ebola virus has not been definitively proven, but the fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus and Epomops franqueti,) is now regarded as the probable primary host. Non-human primates, infected by fruit bats, slaughtered or eaten as
bush meat, have been shown to be the beginning of human infection chains in most outbreaks\textsuperscript{,12} with subsequent human to human transmission in the community and health facilities. All areas in which EVD outbreaks have occurred are characterised by poor health infrastructure, in most cases remoteness from the more developed areas of the countries, and limited resources for infection control and patient isolation.

Five strains of Ebola virus have been described: Ebola Zaire, occurring in outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), Gabon, and the Republic of Congo, Ebola Sudan, occurring in southern Sudan and Uganda, Ebola Bundibugyo, occurring in Uganda and DRC, Ebola Tai Forest, occurring in a single case in Cote d'Ivoire, and Ebola Reston, which has occurred in non-human, laboratory primates linked to the Philippines, with a small number of asymptomatic human cases.

Table I lists the documented EVD outbreaks that have occurred between 1976 and 2012, prior to the 2014 West Africa outbreak.

The current review has two major aims: a): to describe published data on documented EVD outbreaks listed in Table 1, and the current situation in West Africa, to ascertain the evidence for health facility transmission and b) to consider the control strategies that have been implemented, and how previous recommendations may contribute to reducing Ebola transmission in future outbreaks.
Table I. Ebola Virus Disease outbreaks 1976-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>STRAIN</th>
<th>Reported Cases</th>
<th>CFR %</th>
<th>Situation*</th>
<th>Ref:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Zaire (DRC)</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Tai Forest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 (i)</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996(ii)</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-1</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2</td>
<td>Rep Congo</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-3</td>
<td>Rep Congo</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Rep Congo</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Rep Congo</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-8</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Bundibugyo</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-9</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Bundibugyo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-3</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Epidemiological situation:
1. Forest / remote area
2. Hospital centred, with community spread
3. Community and hospital

OUTBREAKS BEFORE 2014: OCCURRENCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY:

The first recorded outbreaks of EVD occurred in June 1976 in southern Sudan\(^1\) (now South Sudan) and in July 1976 in the vicinity of a mission hospital in Yambuku, Zaire (DRC).\(^2,13\) Although the outbreaks occurred at a similar time and in the same geographical area of central Africa, (Yambuku is approximately 500km from Nzara), no definite link between them was established, and later virological studies demonstrated differences between the two strains, subsequently described as the Sudan and Zaire strains.\(^14,15\)
The Sudan outbreak began in the town of Nzara, 400 km from the regional capital Juba, and affected workers in a cotton processing factory. A symptomatic case was transferred to the district hospital of Maridi, where explosive health facility transmission occurred. Within four weeks, one third of the 220 hospital staff had acquired infection, and 41 had died. At this time, there was no knowledge of the mode of transmission of this "new" disease, and no effective infection control activities or personal protective equipment (PPE) were available. Maridi hospital acted as an amplifier for cases in the community, and by the end of the outbreak in October there had been 284 cases and 151 deaths.

Two months after the first case in Nzara, a similar disease became apparent in a mission hospital in Yambuku, Zaire. The initial infections occurred in patients who had attended the outpatient clinic of the hospital. Parenteral injections with syringes not sterilised between patients, from an initial unsuspected index case, was the presumed route of transmission. Subsequent transmission then occurred within the hospital and from infected patients into the community. A total of 318 known cases occurred, with 280 deaths, a CFR of 88%. 11 of the 17 nursing/clinical staff of the hospital died. No patient whose contact was exclusively parenteral injection survived. Investigations indicated that the index case had eaten bush meat during recent forest travel.

Following the 1976 Sudan and Zaire outbreaks, there have been 18 documented EVD outbreaks in central Africa prior to the 2014 West Africa outbreak, and one isolated case in Cote d'Ivoire (in 1994). Epidemiologically, these outbreaks fall into three main groups: those occurring in remote forest areas, linked directly to bush meat consumption, and usually with relatively few cases; those centred around and within regional hospitals, with considerable hospital transmission, spreading into the
community; and those occurring in populated rural areas, with mainly community transmission but some transmission in local health facilities. Forest area outbreaks have occurred in Gabon\textsuperscript{16}, Republic of Congo\textsuperscript{18,19,20,21,22,23} and DRC\textsuperscript{24,25}. With the exception of two large, extended, outbreaks in Republic of Congo and DRC, reported case numbers ranged from 12 - 65, and case fatality rates 57\% - 83\%. One outbreak in DRC was closely associated with fruit bat migration and consumption.\textsuperscript{26,27} Two large outbreaks have occurred linked to regional hospitals, in DRC in 1995\textsuperscript{28,29}, and in Uganda, 2000.\textsuperscript{32,33,34} The outbreak in DRC occurred in Kikwit, a large (350 beds) regional hospital, resulting in infection in 80 health care workers (though some may have been infected in the community), and subsequent spread to other hospitals following patient transfer.\textsuperscript{35,36} The Uganda outbreak, in Gulu district, was centred around two hospitals, and the surrounding communities. There were 425 cases and 224 deaths, including 17 hospital staff. Many of the community cases were associated with attendance at burials. The outbreak spread to another area 150 km distant when a patient was transferred to another hospital.\textsuperscript{37} Outbreaks in rural communities with some health facility involvement have occurred in south Sudan\textsuperscript{38,39,40}, and Uganda\textsuperscript{41,42,43} with case numbers ranging from six to 34 except for an extended outbreak in DRC. In 2007 a new strain of Ebola virus was isolated in an outbreak in Bundibugyi district of Uganda, resulting in 147 reported cases, but a lower CFR than with Zaire or Sudan strains.\textsuperscript{44,45,46} An outbreak caused by the same strain (now termed the Bundibugyo strain) occurred in DRC in 2012,\textsuperscript{47} though no links were discovered between the two areas. An isolated case of Ebola infection occurred in Cote d'Ivoire in 1994, the only reported case of human Ebola infection in West Africa prior to the 2014 epidemic.\textsuperscript{48}
The infection occurred in an expatriate zoologist after undertaking an autopsy on a chimpanzee in the Tai forest area. The zoologist was repatriated and survived. Virology studies showed the strain to be different from those of Sudan and Zaire, and was designated Ebola Tai forest strain.49

EXPOSURE RISK AND DISEASE TRANSMISSION.

While it is accepted that disease transmission, in both health facilities and the community, is by direct contact with body fluids of a symptomatic case, there are limited data on the exposure risks of different body fluids or of different types of contact. An unanswered question in the current 2014 epidemic is why, despite wearing PPE and having some degree of infection control, have so many HCW's acquired infection. For local staff, some may have acquired infection in the community, but clearly transmission is also occurring in health facilities. Bausch et al50 investigated specimens in an isolation ward from 26 laboratory confirmed cases of EVD in the 2000 Uganda outbreak during the acute phase of the illness. Ebola virus was detected by culture or PCR in saliva, stool, semen, breast milk, tears and nasal blood, in both patients who subsequently died and survivors. Virus has been demonstrated in semen for up to 90 days. Apart from the nasal swab, only two specimens visibly contained blood. Environmental sampling was also undertaken. Only two sites were positive, both having visible blood present. The study demonstrated that body fluids other than blood are infectious in symptomatic patients, and that patients do not need to be haemorrhagic to be infectious. Importantly, their results suggested that risk of transmission from fomites in the isolation ward was low. A study by Formenty et al51 during an outbreak in the Republic of Congo demonstrated virus positive saliva in symptomatic cases, which correlated with blood
levels. Several studies have demonstrated higher blood Ebola viral loads in fatal compared to non-fatal cases during the course of disease\textsuperscript{52,53} a finding that has also been demonstrated during the 2014 epidemic\textsuperscript{54} suggesting an increased risk of infectivity in patients who subsequently die. A detailed study during the Uganda 2000 outbreak demonstrated the presence of viral RNA in patients as soon as clinical symptoms appeared,\textsuperscript{53} and a review of Ebola and Marburg cases concluded that there is no evidence that patients are viraemic during the incubation period.\textsuperscript{55} The above studies, although all on small groups of patients, provide some virological evidence for understanding transmission risks, and it is likely that more robust findings will result from studies during the 2014 epidemic.

A review by Ftika et al\textsuperscript{56} has considered the role of health care facilities playing an amplifying role in the evolution of Ebola outbreaks. Analysing data from the 1976 Sudan outbreak, they demonstrated that unprotected nursing of a patient had an attack rate of 81%, limited physical contact (not described in detail), an attack rate of 23%, and no transmission occurred in visiting a room with a symptomatic case, but having no physical contact.

Baron et al\textsuperscript{38} analysed family contacts and disease risk related to exposure in a 1979 south Sudan Ebola outbreak. In a study of 86 contacts of cases, 24 of 36 who provided nursing care developed disease, but disease occurred in only 3 of 23 contacts who had physical contact but no history of nursing care, (OR 5.1, 95% CI 1.31-15.48).

Several studies from the 1995 Kikwit outbreak have investigated the risks in different degrees of exposure/contact with a known case. Dowell et al\textsuperscript{57} showed that in 173 household contacts of a primary case, 28 (16%) developed EVD. All of these secondary cases had direct contact, and exposure to body fluids conferred additional risk. Roels et al\textsuperscript{58} investigated risk factors for patients without a known exposure to a
primary EVD case. Admission to a hospital, and visiting a person with fever and bleeding were the primary risk factors. Rowe et al \(^59\) investigated the possible seroconversion of contacts following the Kikwit outbreak. The study showed a small number of antibody positive, non symptomatic contacts, suggesting that mild forms of the disease may exist, though the role of such cases in transmission is uncertain. Francesconi et al \(^60\) investigated exposure history of cases in Gulu hospital in the 2000 Uganda outbreak. Contact with body fluids (p<.001) and participating in funeral rites (p<.02) were the most significant risk factors for infection. Shared meals with a sick patient, or sharing the same room were not significantly associated with risk of infection.

An important conclusion from these exposure studies is that airborne transmission appears unlikely, as sharing a room, or patient proximity but not direct nursing care, has a much lower risk of infection. While these studies are valuable in confirming the role of body fluids and nursing care in transmission, there are uncertainties in the actual process of transmission, particularly to determine which procedures/contacts are most risk prone and what are the routes of entry if not through unbroken skin.

**HEALTH FACILITY TRANSMISSION AND INFECTION CONTROL IN EVD OUTBREAKS**

From the first recorded EVD outbreaks in Sudan and Zaire in 1976, health facility transmission of Ebola infection has been an important cause of morbidity and mortality, among health care workers and family attendants. The high rates of health facility transmission in these two outbreaks must be put into context. This was a completely unknown disease with high mortality, with an initially unknown mode of transmission, occurring in remote areas of countries with very limited health resources
and means of communication. What is of relevance for all outbreaks after 1976 is that the mode of transmission was now known, the fundamental role of isolation and PPE in interrupting health facility transmission was established, and the international health agencies were aware of the existence of Ebola virus.

The difficulties of implementing infection control activities in under resourced areas of the tropics, including in relation to blood borne viruses have been described in several reviews. However there have been effective strategies reported from several EVD outbreaks. In the 1995 DRC (Kikwit) outbreak, setting up of isolation wards and introduction of PPE, supervision of burials by local Red Cross volunteers, and home care and infection control for patients in the community contributed to the ending of the outbreak.

Studies from other viral haemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Africa can contribute to understanding strategies for appropriate infection control. Effective isolation and infection control was described in a Marburg Haemorrhagic Fever (MHF) outbreak in north-eastern DRC in 1998-99. Two isolation units were created and protective equipment was distributed to health care workers and family members caring for patients. A detailed account of patient management and infection control in a MHF outbreak in Uige, Angola in 2005 describes both hospital and community strategies for reducing disease transmission. The community strategy was particularly relevant. This response included community epidemiological surveillance, clinical assessment and isolation of patients with MHF, safe burials and disinfection, home-based risk reduction, peripheral health facility support, psychosocial support, and information and education campaigns. During a MHF outbreak in Watsa health zone, DRC in 1999, a detailed study was undertaken of the risk procedures undertaken by
HCW’s, the use of protective equipment, and risk of disease transmission. For non-invasive procedures (taking temperature, measuring blood pressure etc) only 19% of staff always used PPE. For invasive procedures 29% always used PPE, but 60% reported not using PPE. The reasons given for inconsistent use of PPE included insufficient availability of equipment, adherence to traditional explanations of the disease (that it was related to poisoning rather than a transmissible agent) and visiting sick colleagues without wearing PPE.

TRADITIONAL BELIEFS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EVD CONTROL PROGRAMMES.

While lack of resources and equipment are major constraints in reducing EVD transmission, local cultural and traditional views of disease, and particularly of EVD, may have a major influence on how technical and medical inputs are followed. A detailed study during the 2001 Gulu, Uganda outbreak into understand why some communities were not following the health programme recommendations. The community in this area of northern Uganda had three explanations for disease: Yat, where disease is explained by ingestion of poisons or other harmful substances, managed by traditional healers, with no link to a medical model, Gemo, where disease is explained by bad spirits, managed by traditional healers, but where there are some connections with a medical model, eg isolation of the patient, a survivor can care for an infected relative, houses with ill patients should be identified by branches or poles, and the biomedical model, which fits into the medical approach to EVD prevention and management. This study showed three particularly relevant findings. Firstly, that unless traditional views of disease are taken into account, however unscientific they may seem, the effect of medical staff, both national and international will be limited.
Secondly, that cultural and traditional interpretations of disease may not be irrelevant, and may have components that can be incorporated into the health programme. Thirdly, while many in the community initially followed the biomedical model, when deaths increased, particularly in the treatment centres, people began to return to traditional models and beliefs. A similar study was undertaken during an Ebola epidemic in the Republic of Congo in 2003. The authors described that while local volunteers undertook extensive health education regarding contact with patients including participation in burials, it was only after greater understanding of traditional beliefs that, as with the Gemo traditions in Uganda, it became clear that traditional practices could be incorporated into the medical model, leading to a more effective programme. The community aspects of Ebola outbreaks also involve the attitudes of local health workers to infection control methods, the use of local volunteers, and how local media cover the outbreak. Several studies were taken during the Uganda 2000 outbreak. A study in Masindi, showed that local staff were concerned about the lack of cultural sensitivity of many infection control methods. One suggestion given was to have body bags with viewing windows, so that relatives could see the face of the deceased at the time of burial. Another study described the role of local Red Cross volunteers in health education, case detection, and also giving support to discharged patients, who were often regarded with uncertainty and suspicion when they returned to their villages. The response of local media also plays a role in how the community responds to the outbreak. A study in Uganda investigated how the 2000 outbreak was portrayed in articles, editorials, letters and cartoons in the two main English language daily newspapers. The responses to the outbreak included confusion, anger, stigma in affected communities, and a climate of fear within many communities. The study conclusions suggest that a careful balance is necessary for the
media to inform about the seriousness of the outbreak, but not to create disproportionate panic. In the 2014 epidemic, it may be necessary to consider the role of social media in this context.

THE 2014/15 WEST AFRICA OUTBREAK.

On March 21, 2014, the Guinea Ministry of Health reported the outbreak of an illness characterised by fever and severe diarrhoea, with a case fatality rate of 59% in the first 49 cases notified. Specimens from 15 of the patients tested were positive for Ebola virus, Zaire strain. By March 30th, cases were reported in a neighbouring area of Liberia, and in May, the first cases in Sierra Leone occurred. By the middle of June, the outbreak had become the largest EVD outbreak ever reported, with a total of 528 cases and 337 deaths. By August 8th, there had been a total of 1848 cases and 1013 deaths, spread between the three countries and a small travel related cluster in Nigeria, and an international public health emergency was declared by WHO.

A number of studies have investigated the possible origin of the outbreak. It was established that the first case, linked through a chain to the cases reported in Guinea on March 21st, was a child in the Gueckedou region of south eastern Guinea who died on 6th December 2013. Virology studies have subsequently confirmed that the virus is the Zaire strain, with 97% homology with earlier strains from DRC and Gabon. The question for many epidemiologists was "how did this strain 'suddenly' appear in West Africa?" The only previously reported case of human EVD in West Africa was the case in Cote d'Ivoire in 1994, caused by a different strain, designated the Tai Forest strain. The possibility of a human, asymptomatic carrier introducing the Zaire strain from central Africa to a remote rural area of Guinea is unlikely. The distance is over 2000km, land communication is difficult, and there is little regular
travel or trade between the two areas. A possibility seriously considered is fruit bat migration from central Africa to the initial epicentre of the new outbreak. What is not clear is whether this strain had been circulating zoonotically in Guinea for some considerable time before human cases appeared, or were reported. Although closely related to the Zaire strain, it is defined as a separate clade. Current virological studies, that have sequenced the strain and compared it to earlier Ebola Zaire isolates, suggest that the outbreak strain has been circulating zoonotically in West Africa since 2004. From early August, the number of cases in the three main affected countries continued to increase dramatically, and the limited treatment centres run by local health resources and international teams were overwhelmed. There are a number of likely reasons for the extent and continuation of the outbreak. Many of these are mirrored in the situation in previous outbreaks: the relative remoteness of and poor health infrastructure in the affected areas, lack of community and local health staff awareness of this new disease, transmission from cases to relatives at village level, transmission during traditional burial practices, and lack of sufficient treatment centres with adequate isolation facilities in the affected areas. However, the current epidemic entered a steeply accelerating phase in August and September when urban transmission, which had become established in Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, in June, began to grow exponentially. By late September, the estimated reproduction numbers were 1.81 for Guinea, 1.51 for Liberia, and 1.38 for Sierra Leone. The corresponding doubling times were 15.7 days, 23.6 days and 30.2 days respectively. At 31.12.14 the total reported case number for Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia was 20,171 cases and 7890 deaths, and by April 2015 (12.4.15), the figures were 25,796 cases and 10689 deaths. The overall case fatality rate among all cases for whom a definitive outcome is known is 71%. Health facility transmission to health staff has
been of particular concern. At 12.4.2015, excluding Nigeria, 864 healthcare workers had been reported to have been infected, of whom 503 had died, \(^6\), table II.

Table II. Ebola Virus Disease cases West Africa outbreak at 12.4.15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All cases*</th>
<th>Health care workers*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3548</td>
<td>2346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>12,206</td>
<td>3857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>10,042</td>
<td>4486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,791</td>
<td>10,689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes confirmed, probable and suspected cases.


Whilst it is thought that many of the infections among health workers occurred due to exposure to infection in health centres and hospitals, in some cases associated with lack of PPE or breaches in IPC, it is also likely that health workers were at risk of unprotected exposure to infection when caring for symptomatic but unconfirmed Ebola cases in the community. A detailed study of Ebola infection in health care workers in Sierra Leone emphasised the lack of PPE, lack of delineation between low and high risk areas in treatment centres, a lack of standard operating procedures for infection control and lack of hand washing and disinfectant facilities. \(^8\) An assessment of infection and prevention control needs in six districts of Sierra Leone demonstrated the lack of infection control leads or coordinators, lack of staff training and problems of transport of infected patients, as well as the lack of PPE and other resource. \(^9\).

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Atlanta developed an Ebola response modelling tool to predict the possible number of cases if the outbreak continued at its
rate in September 2014, and the possible effect of control measures. The pessimistic prediction was over 21,000 cases by November 2014, and between 0.5 and 1.4 million cases by January 2015 according to current trends. However, the model suggested that the epidemic would begin to decrease if approximately 70% of Ebola cases were managed in Ebola treatment centres, and safe burials are undertaken.

The massive United Nations supported international response that began in October 2014 had a strategy of "70:70:60", seventy percent of all patients in treatment centres and seventy percent of all burials using safe practices, within sixty days. While this specific target was not achieved in the time planned it is the massive response that has occurred is contributing to bringing the outbreak under control. Since January 2015, the scale of the epidemic has declined in all three countries, Figure 1, though in Guinea the decline has been less.

The last confirmed case in Liberia was on 27.3.15, and contact monitoring is continuing for the 42 day (2x the maximum incubation) period.

The success in reducing transmission is no doubt due to a combination of the many components put in place with adequate resources; improved case finding and timely transfer to treatment centres, wider adoption of safe burials, improved facilities for infection control in health facilities and the community, and more robust political action to assist programme implementation.

Less clear is whether there have been biological factors related to variations in virus virulence and transmissibility, information that may come out of the various studies that are likely to be implemented.

The global dimension of the West Africa outbreak has been demonstrated by the transmission of infection to health care workers in hospitals in Europe and the U.S.A, from index cases repatriated from Liberia.  

92,93
FUTURE STRATEGIES IN EVD CONTROL

The 2014/15 West Africa EVD outbreak is a public health catastrophe that, even when controlled, will have long lasting effects on both the social fabric and the economy of the countries affected. There are many reasons, as described above, that have made early and effective intervention difficult in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. It is relevant that as well as the poor health infrastructure and lack of development, all three countries have in the recent past been disrupted by civil war and political insecurity. There have, however been 20 previous outbreaks of EVD in tropical Africa, where lessons for surveillance, interruption of community
transmission, infection control in treatment centres, and the need for urgent co-
ordinated international response have been proposed.\textsuperscript{94,95}

Several effective Ebola surveillance programmes have been previously implemented
in DRC. Jezek et al\textsuperscript{96} described a five year surveillance programme (1981-85) in the
Sud-Ubangi region of northern DRC, following previous sporadic reports of possible
EVD cases. The programme included surveillance agents at remote health facilities,
simple case definitions and involvement of village leaders and traditional healers. A
similar surveillance programme was set up following the Kikwit DRC outbreak in
1995.\textsuperscript{97} An example of a hospital based surveillance programme in West Africa for
viral fevers is described in a study from Ghana, which included 18 hospitals in the
Northern and Central regions.\textsuperscript{98} While no cases of viral haemorrhagic fevers
occurred, the study demonstrated the feasibility of setting up such a hospital based
surveillance system over a wide area.

A detailed review of the lessons learned from the 2007 Ebola Bundibugyo outbreak in
Uganda has been described by MacNeil et al\textsuperscript{99} with recommendations for future
outbreaks. These include the importance of having broad surveillance definitions
complemented by rapid diagnostic capacity to correctly identify EVD patients, and
enable control and management programmes to be concentrated where needed. The
study described the long lag period that occurred in the Bundibugyo outbreak between
the retrospectively recognised initial cases, and subsequent outbreak declaration, two
months in the case of this outbreak, and between 1.5 and four months in most
previous outbreaks. As noted earlier, the lag time in the West Africa outbreak was
from early December 2013 to March 2014. This lag time allows community
transmission to occur before any control measures are implemented. The results of
poor infection control practices leading to health facility transmission in viral
haemorrhagic fevers other than Ebola or Marburg have been described for Lassa in Nigeria and Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever in Sudan.\textsuperscript{100, 101, 102}

A major recommendation for improving disease surveillance and public health action at the local level, and enhanced international response preparedness was provided following the 1995 Kikwit, DRC outbreak.\textsuperscript{103} This report provided comprehensive guidelines for preparation for, and management of, large EVD outbreaks, including action at the local level and the responsibilities of WHO. A major recommendation, as well as stockpiling of protective equipment and supplies and effective laboratory support, was the deployment of field epidemiologists to support field investigations and control activities. There are networks and information resources that can be used to provide support and information in the field, examples being the African Field Epidemiology Network \textsuperscript{104} and the web based Global Infectious Disease and Epidemiology Network (GIDEON).\textsuperscript{105}

As is clear from the 2014/15 West Africa outbreak, putting lessons from past outbreaks into practice at an early stage of a new outbreak has many difficulties, though it is evident that there were delays, both locally and internationally in implementing appropriate responses in the early stages of the outbreak. Of additional concern is the possibility of an EVD outbreak occurring in a region in a state of conflict or civil war.\textsuperscript{106, 107} Because of such a possibility, it is essential that the lessons from earlier EVD outbreaks, and the lessons that will no doubt come out of the 2014/15 West Africa outbreak, are formally documented and incorporated into national and international strategies for Ebola control.
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